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FOXES GUARDING THE CHICKEN COOP: INTERVENTION AS
OF RIGHT AND THE DEFENSE OF CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES
Alan Jenkins*
This article focuses on the recent spate of cases in which educational
institutionson the grounds that their race-consciousadmissions policies
are unconstitutional. The author analyzes the role of minority students
and organizations who are the beneficiaries of those polices at the
defendant institutions and their recent attempts to intervene in the
lawsuits pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
First,the author argues that under the traditionalinterpretationof Rule
24(a); intervention of right should be granted to minority students and
organizationsin the great majority of instances. Second, the author looks
at the reasons that courts have denied intervention, analyzing both the
rights and interests of the beneficiaries and the presumption that
government parties provide adequate representation. Third, the author
examines the conflicts between the interests and goals of defendant
institutions and beneficiaries, noting the consequences of denying
intervention. The author concludes by arguing that where the affirmative
action admissions policies of educational institutions are challenged,
district courts should embrace a practical presumption in favor of
interventionfor minority students and organizations
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INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed a rising wave of legal challenges
to structural civil rights remedies. In the wake of Supreme Court
decisions subjecting various race-sensitive policies to strict constitutional scrutiny,1 relaxing standing requirements for plaintiffs
challenging affirmative action programs, 2 and imposing more stringent criteria for the continuation of school desegregation remedies,3
such suits have become both more common and more frequently
successful. Contributing to the increase in such challenges is a cadre
of conservative law centers and think tanks opposed to vigorous
civil rights enforcement. Appropriating the tactics of pro-civil rights
groups that led to Brown v. Board of Education4 and other victories for
equal opportunity, 5 those organizations have litigated affirmative
action challenges on behalf of unsuccessful candidates 6 and opposed
1. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 575 U.S. 200 (1995) (federal disadvantaged
business program); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (electoral districts in which
legislatures subordinate traditional districting principles to racial considerations;
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (municipal contracting setaside ordinance).
2. See generally Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (granting standing to plaintiffs
within "bizarrely-drawn" districts and allowing a claim that the consideration of race
in drawing those districts violated the Equal Protection Clause); Northeastern Fla.
Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993)
(holding that contractors competing under a system alleged unlawfully to consider
race have standing to challenge that system without demonstrating that they would
have been selected absent racial considerations).
3. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (allowing the district court "to relinquish supervision and control of a school district in incremental stages, before full
compliance has been achieved"); Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (relaxing the standard for modification of a school desegregation consent decree); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (overturning
educational improvements and expenditures ordered by district court to remedy
vestiges of past discrimination).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning separate-but-equal doctrine in context of
public schools); see also Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)
(ordering desegregation with "all deliberate speed").
5. See generally, ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL:
JUSTICE FOR ALL (1992) (chronicling, inter alia, the legal campaign by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, and others to overturn the segregationist principle of Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS (1994)
(same); CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW (1998) (same).
6. The principal organization litigating those challenges is the Center for Individual Rights ("CIR"). See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Conservatives Open Drive Against
Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999, at A10 (describing ad campaign by CIR
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the application of traditional anti-discrimination laws to private
industry. 7
With the rise in challenges to race-conscious 8 programs has
come a burgeoning, though more subtle, controversy. In a series of
important cases addressing the validity of affirmative action
programs in education, courts have denied intervention under Rule
24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to minority movants who
seeking to recruit plaintiffs to challenge affirmative action policies); Center for Individual Rights (visited Aug. 31, 1999) <http://www.wdn.com/cir/cr-aa.htm> (describing
CIR's participation in suits against the University of Washington Law School and the
Federal Communications Commission). CIR was also plaintiffs' .counsel in Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 940 (5th Cir. 1996), which has resulted in the invalidation of
affirmative action at the University of Texas Law School; and is currently counsel in
Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 97-CV-75231-DT (E.D. Mich., filed Oct. 14, 1997), in which
plaintiffs challenge affirmative action at the University of Michigan's undergraduate
college; and Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97-CV-75928-DT (E.D. Mich., filed Dec. 3, 1997),
a similar challenge to the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy. A
similar group is the Washington Legal Foundation, which successfully litigated a
challenge to the University of Maryland's scholarship program for African Americans in Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52, 53 (4th Cir. 1992) (listing counsel).
7. In addition to opposing public affirmative action programs on the ground
that government "must not distinguish among its citizens on the basis of race, creed,
color, or ethnicity," Center for Individual Rights, (visited Sept. 6, 1999)
<http://www.wdn.com/cir/cr-aa.htm>, "CIR advocates a limited application of
civil rights laws that would preserve private citizens' right to deal or not to deal with
other private citizens without government scrutiny." Id. Accordingly, the organization has opposed the enforcement of basic anti-discrimination laws against private
parties. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Local Daily News, No. 96-CV-1383 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (challenging standing of fair housing groups and "testers" in suit against
landlord, real estate agents, and newspapers for housing discrimination); Thorpe v.
Virginia State Univ., No. 96CV975 (E.D. Va. 1996) (challenging constitutionality of
Violence Against Women Act); Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car, No. S054561, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 599 (Cal. App. 1996) (challenging, as amicus curiae,court injunction ordering
end to racial harassment in workplace). Commentators at like-minded think tanks
have similarly complemented their critique of affirmative action with opposition to
laws that prohibit intentional discrimination by businesses. See, e.g., Dinesh D'Souza,
Beyond Affirmative Action: The Triumph of the California Civil Rights Initiative Requires a
New Approach to Race in America, NAT'L REv., Dec. 9, 1996, at 26 (suggesting that
individuals and companies be allowed to discriminate in private transactions such as
selecting a business partner or hiring for a job); J. Glassman, Is America Finally Going
Color-Blind?, WASH. POST, June 3, 1997, at A19 (arguing that the policies supporting
affirmative action are disappearing).
8. Many of the issues discussed in this Article are equally applicable to gendersensitive policies. Because the principal cases have involved questions of race, however, this Article will refer primarily to that context.
9. Rule 24 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right.
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional [right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an] interest
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to

Michigan Journal of Race & Law

[VOL. 4:263

are the beneficiaries of those programs." Specifically, students of
color and organizations that represent them have sought, and been
denied, intervention in suits challenging affirmative action
programs at the University of Washington, 1 the University of Texas
Law School, 2 and the Boston Latin Academy." The litigation in
Boston and Texas resulted in the invalidation of race-conscious
policies, while the Washington suit has yet to be resolved 4 Those
courts are thus deciding the future of affirmative action and other
civil rights remedies in cases from which the beneficiaries of those
remedies are absent.
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention.
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional
right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and
the main action have a question of law or fact in common.... In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties.
FED. R.Civ. P. 24.
10. As used here, the term "beneficiaries" refers to those classes of individuals
whom affirmative action policies and other civil rights protections are intended to
benefit directly. A more detailed discussion of those classes is set out infra in Section
H(a).
11. See Smith v. University of Wash. Law Sch., No. C97-335Z (W.D. Wash. July
27, 1998).
12. African American students and applicants attempted unsuccessfully to
intervene in the litigation before trial, see Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603, 605-06 (5th
Cir. 1994), and immediately after trial, see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 959-62
(5th Cir. 1996). A subsequent attempt to intervene at the remedy stage was denied by
the district court for lack of jurisdiction. The author served as co-counsel to the
putative intervenors in the first two motions to intervene and in the appeal from the
first denial of intervention.
13. See Wessman v. Boston Sch. Comm., No.97-11923-JLJ at 1, (D. Mass. Jan. 8,
1998); Wessman v. Boston Sch. Comm., No. 97-11923-JLT, slip op. at 1 (D. Mass.
Sept. 22, 1997).
14. See Wessman v. Gittens, No. 98-1657 (1st Cir. Nov. 19, 1998); Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 940 (5th Cir. 1996). As a result of Washington State's Proposition
1-200, which ended certain forms of state-sponsored affirmative action, the district
court in Smith dismissed as moot a number of the plaintiff's claims for injunctive
relief and declaratory relief. However, other issues in the case remain litigable. See
Smith v. University of Washington Law Sch., No. C97-335Z (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10,
1999).
15. That phenomenon is not entirely new. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) unsuccessfully sought the equivalent of intervention before the California
Supreme Court. After that court's adverse ruling on the merits in Bakke, but before
the court rejected the Regents' petition for rehearing, the NAACP requested that the
court "remand this case to the trial court for a new trial with directions to the trial
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By contrast, the Sixth Circuit recently reversed the denial of
intervention to minority students and organizations in suits
against the University of Michigan's law school and undergraduate college."6 And in earlier decisions, district courts granted
intervention to similar applicants in affirmative action suits against
the University System of Georgia 17 and the University of Maryland. 8
Given the legal and social salience of race-sensitive programs and
the ambiguity of past Supreme Court rulings on the issue,' 9 a case
court to permit the real parties in interest to present evidence on the full range of
issues." Emma C. Jones, Litigation Without Representation: The Need for Intervention to
Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 33 n.9 (1979) (quoting Petition of the NAACP for Leave to File as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Rehearing at 6,
Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152 (1976)). The court denied the
petition for rehearing, ignoring the request for a remand. See id.
Bakke notwithstanding, courts generally granted beneficiaries intervention in
affirmative action cases until quite recently. See, e.g., Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904
F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1990) (granting intervention to Black applicants and employees of
municipal fire department in challenge to department's affirmative action employment policy); Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of New Haven, 130 F.R.D. 4, 11 (D.
Conn. 1990) (allowing minority contractors' association to intervene in affirmative
action challenge to represent "private" interests); Associated Gen. Contractors v. San
Francisco, 1985 WL 153 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (allowing minority business concerns to
intervene in constitutional challenge to city's race-conscious contracting ordinance);
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 459 F. Supp. 766, 771 (C.D.
Cal 1978) (allowing civil rights organizations to intervene in challenge to federal
affirmative action program).
16. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 1999 FED App. 0295P (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1999)
(reversing Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97-CV-75928-DT (E.D. Mich. July 6, 1998)
(opinion and order denying intervention in University of Michigan Law School case)
(available at University of Michigan Law School) (visited September 5, 1999)
<http://umich.edu/-newsinfo/Admission/gruord.html>; Gratz v. Bollinger, 183
F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (order denying motion to intervene in undergraduate
college case).
17. See Wooden v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV-497-45 (S.D.
Ga. Sept. 10, 1997) (granting intervention to the Georgia State Conference of the
NAACP and others challenging the consideration of race in remedying Georgia's
formerly-segregated system of higher education).
18. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, No. JFM-90-1685, (Aug. 10, 1992) noted in 38 F. 3d
147, 162 n.* (4th Cir. 1992) (noting the grant of intervention for minority applicants in
challenge to scholarship program for African Americans at University of Maryland).
19. The Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions have been fractious and
unstable. Often, no opinion has commanded five votes, see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Wygant v. Jackson County Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986), and recent precedent has been overturned or questioned. See, e.g., Adarand
Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225-27 (1995) (overturning aspects of Metro
Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980)). Moreover, while the Court's decisions have repeatedly stated that raceconscious programs are permissible in some circumstances, see City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 480
(1986), and cases cited therein; see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 ("The Court is in
agreement that... remedying past or present racial discrimination... is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed
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addressing the validity of affirmative action in education seems
likely to reach the High Court in the near future.2' The silence of
students of color in many of those cases is therefore all the more
deafening.
Without intervention by beneficiaries, affirmative action cases
typically pit unsuccessful White applicants and counsel opposed to
traditional civil rights enforcement against governments and other
institutions with a history of racial bias" and strong incentives to
avoid confessing civil rights liability.2 None of those parties have an
unencumbered interest in identifying or preserving the constitutional and statutory obligations of public institutions to halt, avoid,
and remedy discrimination against people of color; indeed, maintaining those obligations is contrary to the central interests of both
sides.' Furthermore, each party in a bipolar affirmative action case
faces strong disincentives to presenting evidence of recent discrimination by the defendant or questioning the validity of standardized tests
and other selection criteria that may discriminatorily exclude certain
classes of applicants. 24
Yet those issues are at the core of litigation regarding the validity of affirmative action policies." In ruling on race-conscious
remedies, moreover, courts necessarily make legal and factual findings that affect the rights and opportunities of people of color
beyond the narrow context of a particular challenged policy. 26 Those
rulings can have the effect of vitiating a defendant's duty to prevent
and remedy racial bias. Therefore, at stake for minority beneficiaries
affirmative action program.") (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment), recent opinions have failed to indicate the precise characteristics of a
lawful program. See Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (striking down the programs at issue but
not identifying viable alternatives); Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (same). But see Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1978) (discussing favorably and in detail
the admissions policy employed by Harvard University).
20. Although the Supreme Court unanimously denied a petition for certiorari in
Hopwood, two Justices noted that their decision was based upon the unique posture
of the case rather than a determination that the issues presented did not warrant
Supreme Court review. See Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (opinion of
Ginsburg, J., with whom Souter, J., joins). The Court subsequently granted certiorari
in Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert.
granted,521 U.S. 1117 (1997), which presented the issue of the legality under Title VII
of the use of racial diversity considerations in the decision to lay off a White teacher.
The Court subsequently dismissed the case as moot after the litigation was settled.
See Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010
(1997).
21. See infra notes 140 and 149 and accompanying text.
22. See discussion infra, Part III(B).
23. See id.
24. See infra notes 154, 170.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 247-283.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 158-170.
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is not only the loss of affirmative action polices, but also adverse
legal and factual findings that can further erode their rights and
opportunities.
The dramatic decline in minority participation in many institutions where affirmative action has been terminated illustrates the
serious practical ramifications of that erosion. For example, in 1997,
the first year in which the Hopwood decision was in effect at the University of Texas, applications from African American students
dropped 30 percent from the previous year. The proportions of
African American and Mexican American students admitted to the
1997 class were 19 percent and 52 percent of 1996 proportions, respectively."' The graduate business program experienced similar
declines.29 In California, where a voter referendum 30 and a decision
by the Regents of the University of California 31 ended affirmative
action, African American enrollment dropped by 63 percent, while
Latino enrollment decreased by 34 percent.32 Those changes affect
not only qualified minority students who are turned away from
flagship institutions, but also those who choose not to attend such
institutions because of racial isolation, and students of all races who
attend institutions that are virtually segregated.
This Article contends that the ordinary operation of Rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure almost always entitles the
beneficiaries of affirmative action programs to intervention as of
right in suits challenging those programs. Court decisions to the
contrary, the Article argues, misapprehend the essential function of
Rule 24. Part I traces the history and development of Rule 24,
concluding that the values and principles that underlie the rule
make intervention appropriate in these circumstances. Part II
analyzes the grounds on which courts have denied intervention in
affirmative action cases. That Part first addresses the important legal
rights and practical interests of beneficiaries that are at stake in those
27.

Jorge Chapa & Vincent A. Lazaro, Hopwood in Texas: The Untimely End of

Affirmative Action, in CHILLING ADMISSIONS: THE AFFIRMATIvE ACTION CRISIS AND
THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 51 (Gary Orfield & Edward Miller eds., 1998).
28. Id.

29. Id. Both the law school and the business school rely heavily on standardized
test scores for admission. Id.
30. Proposition 209, codified at CAL. CONST. art I, § 31.
31. Regents of the University of California, Policy Ensuring Equal Treatment in
Admissions (SP-1), POLICIES OF THE REGENTS, July 20, 1995; see Amy Wallace & Dave
Lesher, UC Regents, In Historic Vote, Wipe Out Affirmative Action, L.A. TIMES, July 21,
1995, at Al.
32. See Gary Orfield, Campus Resegregation and Its Alternatives, in CHILLING
ADMISSIONS: THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CRISIS AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 1,

1 (Gary Orfield & Edward Miller eds., 1998).
33. The Article will not address at length the availability and operation of permissive intervention under Rule 24(b).
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cases. Next, it examines the presumption, employed by a number of
courts of appeals, that governmental parties adequately represent
the interests of putative intervenors, making intervention
inappropriate. It contends that such a presumption contravenes
Supreme Court precedent and ignores the conflicts between the
broad interests of governmental entities and the narrower concerns
of individuals affected by government policies. Part III argues that,
even assuming the validity of a presumption of adequate
governmental representation, intervention by beneficiaries is
appropriate in the vast majority of affirmative action cases because
of conflicts between institutional defendants and beneficiaries. Part
IV discusses the consequences of denying intervention in these cases.
Finally, the Article recommends that courts adopt a practical
presumption in favor of intervention by beneficiaries, absent
particularized countervailing circumstances.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO INTERVENTION

The evolution of the intervention mechanism reflects a gradual
broadening of the role of non-parties and a shift from a formalistic
approach to a focus on the practical consequences of litigation on
outsiders. As the doctrine first developed in American admiralty,
equity, and common law procedure, it was generally limited to cases
in which the court retained custody of real or personal property in
which the putative intervenor claimed an interest.34 Outside of that
context, "the notion that third persons might invite themselves into
lawsuits between others ran counter to the Anglo-American notion
that the plaintiff was the master of the suit."''
Early state code provisions and Rule 37 of the former Federal
Rules of Equity were somewhat broader, but provided that
intervention should be subordinate to the propriety of the main
proceeding.37 Courts generally construed that condition to require
that the intervenor align itself with one of the original parties on
34. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.17, at 542 (4th ed. 1992).
By contrast, the Roman law tradition was far more inclusive. See 6 JAMES WM.
MOORE FT AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

24 App.101 (2d ed.

1999).
35. JAMES ET AL., supra note 34, § 10.17, at 542.
36. See id. § 10.17, at 543 n.7.
37.

See FED. R. EQUITY 37 (1912) cited in CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE

LAW OF CODE PLEADINGS § 65, at 424 n.290 (2d ed. 1947) ("Anyone claiming an
interest in the litigation may at any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention; but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the
propriety of the main proceeding."); see also CLARK, supra § 65, at 421 n.285. (listing
state statutes); id. § 65, at 424-425 (discussing the former equity rule that intervention be subordinated to the original suit).
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the existing issues.3 As one respected treatise notes, "[tihis
interpretation frustrated intervention by one who asserted a position
antagonistic to both existing parties and greatly diminished the
practical value of the procedure., 39 The earliest American incarnations of the intervention mechanism thus assumed a bipolar
dispute in which the interests of non-parties were ancillary to the
litigation and secondary to those of the original parties.
That approach changed somewhat with the institution of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. As originally adopted, Rule
24(a)(2) provided for intervention where "[t]he representation of the
applicant's interests by existing parties is or may be inadequate and
the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action." 4 As
Professor Kaplan, the drafter of the 1966 amendments to the Federal
Rules, has explained, the provision "was intended to permit a
beneficiary, say, to come into an action in which his fiduciary was
appearing for him when the fiduciary suffered a conflict of interest
or other disqualification; and the same applied to a member of a
class coming into a class action to challenge and improve the
representation."'" In other words, the Rule was pertinent where a
non-party's apparent representative in existing litigation might not,
in fact, share its interests because of legal or practical conflicts.
Unlike its predecessors, moreover, the new rule did not sublimate
the interests of putative intervenors to those of the existing parties or
require alignment with one of the existing parties.
Most courts, however, interpreted the "is or may be bound"
language of former Rule 24(a)(2) to require a showing that the origi-42
nal action might have a res judicataeffect on the putative intervenor.
That reading created a Catch-22: movants who were not adequately
represented by the existing parties necessarily could not be bound

38.

See JAMES ET AL., supra note 34, 10.17 at 543.

39.

Id.

40.

FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a)(2) (1938) (repealed 1966).

41. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 401 (1967); see also Advi-

sory Comm. Notes to 1966 Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure
[hereinafter Advisory Comm. Notes], 39 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1966) ("The general purpose
of original Rule 24(a)(2) was to entitle an absentee, purportedly represented by a
party, to intervene in the action if he could establish with fair probability that the
representation was inadequate.").
42.

See Degge v. City of Boulder, 336 F.2d 220, 222 (10th Cir. 1964) (stating that

the test in the circuit is whether the applicants will be bound by res judicata); Atlantic
Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil, 304 F.2d 387, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("It is now well settled that
in conventional litigation, the test to be applied in determining whether an applicant
for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) will be bound by a judgment in the action is
whether he would be bound by such judgment under the doctrine of res judicata.")
(citation omitted).
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under res judicata principles, and those who would be bound could
not demonstrate inadequate representation.' The Supreme Court
solidified the dilemma for putative intervenors in Sam Fox Publishing
Co. v. United States,4" by embracing rather than resolving that paradoxical interpretation.'
Complementing the old Rule 24(a)(2) was former Rule 24(a)(3),
which provided for intervention of right when the movant was "so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property which is in the custody of the court."47 That
provision went beyond the threat of res judicata to acknowledge the
practical consequences of litigation on non-parties. The rule recognized that, in litigation concerning the disposition of property, nonparties with an interest in the property could be irreparably injured
if the court did not hear and consider their interests in the first instance, irrespective of whether they would be formally bound by the
judgment. Nor was that threat limited to non-parties who were
aligned with one of the existing parties. To the contrary, a non-party
with an independent interest in the property was often at a greater
risk, since the litigation might distribute the entire property to the
existing parties, nullifying the non-party's interest. Despite its practical focus, however, the rule was of limited applicability because it
reached only disputes over property in court custody.
Over time, an increasing number of lower courts resisted a strict
interpretation of former Rules 24(a)(2) and 24(a)(3), refusing to
require formal res judicata effect in cases under the former, 48 and
stretching the meaning of "property" in the latter to embrace a
broader range of controversies.49 That resistance highlighted the
limited utility of the two provisions and led the Advisory

43. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
44. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 34, § 10.17 at 544 (describing the "absurdity" of
requiring both the threat of res judicata and inadequate representation); Kaplan, supra
note 41, at 401-402 (same); see also Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153, 156 (9th Cir. 1964)
(acknowledging dilemma).
45. 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
46. See id. at 690-691 (denying intervention to private non-parties in government
antitrust case on ground that they would not be precluded from bringing subsequent
litigation); see also John W. Stack, Comment, Intervention of Right in Class Actions: The
Dilemma of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), 50 CAL. L. REv. 89 (1962)
(describing the effects of the Sam Fox decision).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(3) (1938) (repealed 1966).
48. See International Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857, 861 (2d
Cir. 1962) ("[W]e conclude that in determining whether an applicant 'is or may be
bound,' the district court is required to apply a practical test."); Atlantic Ref. Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., 304 F.2d 387, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (same).
49. See Kaplan, supra note 41, at 401 (citing Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co.,
275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1960)).
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Committee to revise and combine them in 1966.50 The 1966
amendments eliminated the distinction between suits over property
and other types of cases,"1 removed the implied requirement of res
judicata effect, and imposed a practical test with respect to both the
potential consequences of the litigation for movants and the
adequacy of representation. Rule 24(a) now provides that "anyone
shall be permitted to intervene in an action" when a statute confers
that right,52 or when
[T]he applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and
the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.53
There has been some confusion as to whether the 1966
amendments shifted the burden of persuasion on the adequaterepresentation issue from the movant to the party resisting
intervention.54 In any event, it is clear that the amended provision is
satisfied where representation of an applicant's interest "may be"
inadequate, 55 and that the adequacy inquiry calls for a flexible
judgment.56 Those changes necessarily contemplate a more inclusive,
50. See Advisory Comm. Notes, supra note 41, at 109-110 (describing rationale
for combining former Rules 24(a)(2) and 24(a)(3)).
51. See id. at 109 ("If an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical
sense by the determination made in an action, he should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene, and his right to do so should not depend on whether there is a fund
to be distributed or otherwise disposed of.").
52. The prototypical intervention statute is 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1994), which, inter
alia, authorizes intervention by the United States Attorney General in suits challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute.
53. FED R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
54. Compare Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("While the
change in wording does not relate to any change in standard as such, it underscores
both the burden on those opposing intervention to show the adequacy of the existing
representation and the need for a liberal application in favor of permitting intervention."), Texas v. United States Dep't of Energy, 754 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1985)
(same), and 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1909, at 314 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE] ("[T]he effect of
this change is to shift the burden of persuasion.") with Ordinance Container Corp. v.
Sperry Rand Corp., 478 F.2d 844, 845 (5th Cir. 1973) (suggesting that movants retain
the burden of persuasion as to adequacy of representation). While the burdenshifting argument is a persuasive one, this Article assumes that the movant retains
the burden of persuasion as to each element of the intervention inquiry.
55. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972).
56. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 34, § 10.17, at 544-545 ("Rule 24(a)'s third requirement-that the applicant's interest be inadequately represented by existing
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practical approach to intervention of right that invites the
participation of affected non-parties irrespective of their formal
relationship to the original57 litigants and without regard to the
alignment of their interests.
Modem Rule 24 thus reflects the reality of what Professor
Chayes has called "public law litigation.""8 Along with Rule 19
(regarding joinder of necessary parties), Rule 23 (regarding class
actions), and Rule 22 (regarding interpleader), amended Rule 24
recognizes that, in an increasing number of cases, the litigation has
"important consequences for many persons including absentees"
parties-also calls for a flexible judgment."); see also Kaplan, supra note 41, at 403
("[Adequacy] is to be decided without fetishes of form.").
57. See Advisory Comm. Notes, supra note 41, at 110 (stating that the 1966
amendments "import[] practical considerations, and the deletion of the 'bound'
language similarly frees the rule from undue preoccupation with strict considerations of res judicata"); id. at 109 ("If an absentee would be substantially affected in a
practical sense by the determination made in an action he should, as a general rule,
be entitled to intervene, and his right to do so should not depend on whether there is
a fund to be distributed or otherwise disposed of.").
58. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (discussing the increasing determination of issues of
public law through civil litigation); Jones, supra note 15, at 32, 39-40 nn.25-36. In
contrast to the bipolar, self-contained "traditional" model of litigation, Professor
Chayes describes public law cases as -those in which:
(1) The scope of the lawsuit is not exogenously given but is shaped
primarily by the court and parties.
(2) The party structure is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and
amorphous.
(3) The fact inquiry is not historical and adjudicative but predictive
and legislative.
(4) Relief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a form
logically derived from the substantive liability and confined in its
impact to the immediate parties; instead, it is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadly remedial lines, often -having
important consequences for many persons including absentees.
(5) The remedy is not imposed but negotiated.
(6) The judge is not passive, his function limited to analysis and
statement of governing legal rules; he is active, with responsibility
not only for credible fact evaluation but for organizing and shaping
the litigation to ensure a just and viable outcome.
(7) The subject matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private
individuals about private rights, but a grievance about the operation
of public policy.
Chayes, supra at 1302; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law,
Retroactivity, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV.L. REV. 1733, 1765 (1991) (noting
that constitutional remedies serve the dual purpose of remediating private injuries
and enforcing structural limitations on governmental power).
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and "[tihe subject matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between
private individuals about private rights, but a grievance about the
operation of public policy."59
Two Supreme Court cases decided soon after the 1966 amendments reflect the public law regime's more inclusive approach. In
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,' three nonparties sought to intervene in an action by the federal government
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The putative intervenors were:
the State of California, where the defendant sold most of its gas; a
large industrial user of natural gas who purchased from the defendant's sources; and a natural gas distributor, whose sole supplier of
natural gas had been the acquired company and would be the new,
merged company.61 The Government and El Paso presented a proposed consent decree to the district court and those non-parties
sought to intervene in order to oppose the decree as inadequate to
protect healthy competition in the industry.62
The district court denied intervention of right and permissive
intervention, but allowed the applicants to participate as amicus
curiae.63 The Supreme Court reversed on direct appeal, granting intervention of right to all parties and directing de novo hearings on a
proper remedy. 4 The Court acknowledged the movants' interest in
averting a settlement that they alleged would "reduce[] the competitive factor in natural gas available to Californians."' Suggesting that
the proposed settlement did not, in fact, provide for a competitive
environment,' the Court further found that the parties had not adequately represented the applicants' interests.67

59. Chayes, supra note 55 at 1302; see also Chayes, supra note 55 at 1289-95, 130210; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 270, 270 n.1 (1989) (arguing that public law cases set out to
"vindicate important social values that affect numerous individuals and entities.");
Cindy Vreeland, Comment, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal
Rule 24(a), 57 U. CHi. L. REV. 279, 302-06 (1990) (arguing that intervention is more
frequently appropriate in public law cases).
60. 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
61. See id. at 132-34.
62. See id.
63. See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 37 F.R.D. 330, 331-33 (D. Utah
1965).
64. See Cascade, 386 U.S. at 135-36. The Court found the intervention of California and the user of natural gas to be required by former Rule 24(a)(3), which was in
force at the time of the applicants' motion. It held that the distributor was entitled to
intervention under amended Rule 24(a)(2) as to "further proceedings."
65. Id. at 135.
66. See id. at 136-43 ("The Department of Justice, . . . by stipulation or otherwise
has no authority to circumscribe the power of the courts to see that our mandate is
carried out.").
67. See id. at 136-43.
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In Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America,"s a union member
sought to intervene in a suit initiated by the Secretary of Labor to set
aside a union election under the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (LMRDA).69 Although the LMRDA designated the
Secretary as the sole entity authorized to initiate such suits on behalf
of union members, 0 the Supreme Court found intervention of right
to be required, rejecting the Secretary's argument that he would
adequately represent the member's interests.7 In so doing, the Court
expressly recognized the dichotomy between the union member's
interest in a lawful election and the broader "public interest" pursued by the Secretary. In addition to protecting the rights of union
members, the Court explained, "the Secretary has an obligation to
protect the vital public interest in assuring free and democratic union elections that transcends the narrower interest of the
complaining union member.... Both functions are important, and
they may not always dictate precisely the same approach to the
conduct of the litigation."' The requirement of inadequate representation, the Court stated, "is satisfied if the applicant shows that
representation of his interest may be inadequate; and the burden of
making that showing should be treated as minimal."7'
Importantly, both Cascade and Trbovich involved government
plaintiffs authorized by statute to pursue the same interests that the
intervenors sought to protect-free competition in Cascade and
democratic union elections in Trbovich. Both suits, too, were public
law cases, intended to effect structural change, as well as to remedy
individual harms. While the Cascade Court hinted that the Government in that case had been lax in its responsibilities, 74 the Trbovich
Court expressly rejected any notion that the Secretary had "failed to
perform his statutory duty."' It relied instead on the Secretary's
conflicting interests vis-a-vis union members. 7
So construed, Rule 24(a)(2) acknowledges the distinction between the broad and diverse interests of governmental litigants, and
the narrower interests of non-parties affected by those litigants'
policies. It also recognizes that an overlap of interests does not guarantee adequate representation where the existing party must balance
68.

404 U.S. 528 (1972).

69.
70.

29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1994).
See id. at § 483.

71.

See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538-539.

72.
73.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Id. at 538 n.10 (emphasis added).

74. See Cascade, Natural Gas Corp v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 136
(1967).
75. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538.
76.

See id.
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other countervailing concerns against the interest it shares with a
non-party.7 Rather, representation in those circumstances "may be"
inadequate, and that is all that Rule 24(a)(2) requires. 7'
The development of amended Rule 24(a)(2) reveals that the rule
serves three primary functions: (1) it protects the interests of nonparties; (2) it advances the courts' truthseeking role; and (3) it promotes judicial economy. The protective function is manifest from the
text of the rule, which allows a non-party to participate when he is
"so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect [a cognizable] interest."''
Importantly, the protective function extends beyond an applicant's interest in the particular outcomes sought by the existing
parties. Rather, an applicant's participation may focus on a subsidiary issue before the court, the disposition of which will affect the
applicant's interest. Alternatively, the applicant's interest may be
adverse to both parties, yet directly implicated by the litigation.'
77. There was no question in Trbovich, for example, that the government's interests included union members' right to a fair election. Yet the Court correctly
recognized that the government's other duties and concerns compromised that
interest. The same was true of the Cascade intervenors' interest in free competition,
which was among the government's objectives in that litigation. See also WRIGHT,
MILLER & KANE, supra note 54, § 1909, at 319:
[I]f [the applicant's] interest is similar to, but not identical with, that
of one of the parties, a discriminating judgment is required on the
circumstances of the particular case, but he ordinarily should be allowed to intervene unless it is clear that the party will provide
adequate representation for the absentee.
78. See Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 1990) (" '[Interests
need not be wholly 'adverse' before there is a basis for concluding that existing
representation of a 'different' interest may be inadequate."' (quoting Nuesse v.
Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1967))); Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 704 (A "serious possibility" that the absentee's interest "may not be adequately represented" is enough to
satisfy the rule); Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir.
1997) ("[It may be enough to show that the existing party who purports to seek the
same outcome will not make all of the prospective intervenor's arguments.").
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see also Jean L. Doyle, Note, Federal Rule 24: Defining
Interestfor Purposes of Intervention of Right by an Environmental Organization, 22 VAL.
U. L. REV. 109, 121 (1987) ("Protecting third parties has historically been a major
policy concern of intervention, and, with the modern trend toward expanding civil
litigation beyond purely private concerns, this protective function has become increasingly important.").
80. See Jones, supra note 15, at 42 ("[Ilntervention can prevent injury to nonparties whose interests bear a sufficiently close connection to the matter being litigated
.... In public law litigation, with its frequent objective of reordering prominent
social policies and institutions, non-parties must be protected from the everwidening impact of such lawsuits."). A quintessential example is Cascade Natural Gas
Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967), in which the applicants opposed
the outcome to which both of the existing parties had agreed. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68. Further, many courts presume that representation is adequate
where an applicant seeks the same "ultimate objective" as an existing party. See, e.g.,
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With respect to the truthseeking function, Rule 24(a)(2)
recognizes that the participation-of non-parties with meaningful but
unrepresented interests increases the likelihood that all legal and
factual issues in the suit will be fully identified and vigorously
litigated. Like the joinder of necessary parties under Rule 19, Rule
24(a)(2) acknowledges that our adversarial decisionmaking process
suffers where relevant concerns are not presented to the court by
litigants with a direct interest in doing so.8 The rule therefore
affords intervention where it appears that movants would offer
evidence and arguments that the existing parties would not.82
Here it should be noted that a number of courts have allowed
applicants to participate as amicus curiae in lieu of intervention.83
Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996); Meek v. Metropolitan
Dade County, 985 F.2d 1471, 1477-78 (11th Cir. 1993). If an applicant could also be
denied intervention because it sought to advance a different outcome from the existing parties, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which intervention would be
appropriate. It is precisely that type of catch-22 that the 1966 amendments' more
pragmatic approach sought to avoid.
81. See Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 50 F.R.D. 99, 102 (C.D. Cal. 1970)
("[I]t is only in those cases where the prospective intervenor appears to have a sufficient stake in the outcome and enough to contribute to the resolution of the
controversy, that a right to intervene arises."). That principle is most frequently
expressed in the context of standing. Under Article III of the Constitution, courts
demand that litigants demonstrate a personal stake in a lawsuit so as to assure "that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult questions." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 99 (1968) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). Even where the existing parties satisfy the minimum requirements of Article III, conflicts and limitations
in their interests may make the participation of non-parties important to the truthseeking process.
82. See Jones, supra note 15, at 42 ("[I]ntervention often expands the information
available to a court in its search for an equitable adjudication of the merits of the
lawsuit." (citing Black v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954-955 (9th Cir. 1977)); see also David
L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81
HARv. L. REv. 721, 745 (1968) ("The resources of the litigating arm of the government
are ... limited, and persons with special interests may be able to offer useful information otherwise unavailable to the court, particularly on the question of
appropriate relief."). For example, the Ninth Circuit's intervention analysis inquires:
[Wihether the interests of a present party to the suit are such that it
will undoubtedly make all of the intervenor's arguments; whether
the present party is able and willing to make such arguments; and
whether the intervenor would offer any necessary element to the
proceedings that other parties would neglect.
United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing County of
Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438-439 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also, Jansen v. City of
Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 1990) (granting intervention where city and
African American putative intervenors disagreed as to factual predicate for affirmative action plan).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984)
(environmental groups attempting to intervene in action against corporation by the
government); Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1977) (federal securities class
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While amicus participation can be important in informing the court
of alternative arguments and perspectives, it is no substitute for
intervention as a party under Rule 24(a)(2). Depending on the point
at which they join the litigation, intervenors may engage in pleadings, discovery, and motion practice; introduce evidence; examine
and cross-examine witnesses at trial; and appeal adverse judgements. None of those mechanisms are available to amici, who are
essentially relegated to advancing supplemental legal arguments
and alternative interpretations of the existing parties' evidence.'
The judicial economy concern is forward looking: it seeks to
diminish the use of judicial resources in future litigation by nonparties affected by the instant suit. The benefit, where parties
intervene, of disposing of all issues in a single proceeding and
avoiding later suits by rejected applicants on the same subject matter
outweighs potential delay or disruption of the original suit.8
Importantly, the judicial economy concern does not justify denying
intervention on the ground that it would expand the present
litigation, except insofar as the movant's participation would simply
duplicate that of the existing parties (thus defeating the truth
seeking function).8 While Rule 24(b) expressly includes the potential
for undue delay as a consideration in the permissive intervention
inquiry, 7 that factor is not directly relevant in the award of
action); United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'r., 466 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1972) (school
desegregation case).
84. See Coalition of Ariz./N.M. Counties v. Department of Interior, 100 F.3d 837,
844 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he right to file a brief as amicus curiae is no substitute for the
right to intervene as a party in the action under Rule 24(a)(2).").
85. See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (describing Rule
24(a)(2)'s "goal of disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned
persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process"); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v.
United States, 379 F.2d 818, 825 (5th Cir. 1967) (noting the "great public interest...
[in] having a disposition.., of as much of the controversy to as many of the parties
as fairly possible"); see also Brennan v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 519 F.2d 718, 720
(8th Cir. 1975) (stating that one of the purposes behind Rule 24 is to discourage
"piecemeal litigation)"; Jones, supra note 15, at 42 nn.41-42 ("[Ilntervention serves the
goal of judicial economy by the consolidation of related issues into a single suit.
Intervenors are welcomed into a pending lawsuit when to do so would prevent
proliferation of similar litigation or discourage piecemeal adjudication.") (citing
Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1049 (5th Cir. 1975)).
86. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 79 F.R.D. 235, 243 (D.D.C.
1978) (denying intervention where movant's arguments "will be cumulative of the
arguments advanced by other defendants").
87. Rule 24(b) provides, in pertinent part:
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an
action... when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common.... In exercising its discretion
the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
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intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2).8 Indeed, giving negative
weight both to participation that would expand the scope of
litigation and also to participation that would merely duplicate the
existing parties' case89 would erect a paradoxical, and virtually
insurmountable, barrier to third-party participation. To the extent
that the inclusion of additional litigants poses manageability
concerns, courts' inherent authority to control cases within their
jurisdiction is sufficient to address those issues. In particular, a court
clearly has authority to constrain the participation of intervenors,
consistent with the protection of their interests.0 As the Advisory
Committee on the 1966 amendments to Rule 24 explained,
"intervention of right under the amended rule may be subject to
appropriate conditions or restrictions responsive among other things
to the requirements of efficient conduct of the proceedings." 91
The foregoing principles emphasize the confluence of the identity of the movant, the interests that she seeks to protect through
intervention, and her relationship to the parties vis-a-vis those interests. In applying those principles to the context of affirmative action
challenges, several categories of individuals occupy the position of
affected non-party that warrants intervention of right.

88. See Jones, supra note 15, at 12, 56 ("Unlike rule 24(b), ... the text of rule
24(a)(2) contains no language which could be construed to permit, let alone recommend, balancing the intervenor's interest against possible prejudice to the original
parties or injecting considerations of judicial efficiency."); Cohn, The New Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1232 (1966) (same). Again, this argument
assumes that the motion to intervene is timely. See infra note 112. Under Rule
24(a)(2), courts may properly consider prejudice to the existing parties that would
result from the movant's delay in seeking intervention. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 34,
§ 10.17, at 547. That is different, however, from disruption or expansion of the litigation that would result from intervention irrespective of when the movant filed its
motion.
89. See American Lung Ass'n v. Reilly, 962 F.2d 258, 262 (2d Cir. 1992) (giving
negative weight under Rule 24(a)(2) to the fact that movant's participation would be
redundant); Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Gulf States Util., 940 F.2d 117, 120-121
(5th Cir. 1991) (same).
90. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 34, § 10.17 at 545 ("Sometimes, the court will
allow an intervenor to participate in some issues but not in others, or will limit the
intervenor's manner of participation by requiring leave of court before the intervenor can take a deposition."); cf.Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'r, 101 F.3d 503, 509 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying application to intervene of right, but
suggesting that applicants could file standby or "conditional" application to intervene).
91. Advisory Comm. Notes, supra note 41, at 111. Of course, to the extent that
courts limit the issues on which intervenors may present evidence and examine
witnesses, the preclusive effect of any judgment will be similarly limited. For a
general discussion of issue preclusion, see 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 54,
§ 4420, at 182-192 (1981).
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II. NON-PARTY INTERESTS IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES
A. Beneficiaries of Affirmative Action
At least three classes of non-parties possess interests that are directly implicated by affirmative action litigation. For purposes of
this discussion, they will be referred to as "beneficiaries" of the
challenged policies. The first and most obvious class consists of applicants from underrepresented racial groups who compete with
plaintiffs challenging affirmative action policies and other applicants
for opportunities under the challenged program. Like the plaintiffs,
those minority applicants have a direct, practical interest in the system under which-they are evaluated for-in this case-educational
opportunities.92 Moreover, if the plaintiffs are successful, the litigation will almost certainly diminish the likelihood that minority
applicants may obtain those opportunities. That reality is reflected in
the declines in minority applicants, admittees, and matriculants at
many of the
campuses that have ended their affirmative admissions
93
programs.
In challenges to educational programs, a second class of beneficiaries consists of existing students of all races at the defendant
institution who seek to preserve an integrated or diverse environment at that institution. While an affirmative action challenge is
unlikely to threaten their place within the student body,9 members
of that class have a direct interest in the diversity of the environment
in which they study or work. A third class consists of organizations
that represent the individuals described above. For the reasons that
justify the principle of organizational standing, 9" an association may

92. The central analysis advanced in this Article is equally applicable to cases
challenging race-sensitive programs in employment and public contracting.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 28-33.
94. Courts to date have not divested existing students of their positions, even
where those courts have invalidated the existing selection criteria.
95. An organization may assert standing to sue on its own behalf where it can
allege "a concrete and demonstrable injury to [its] activities," Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982), or, on behalf of its members, where: a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). In similar circumstances,
courts have frequently granted intervention to organizational litigants. See, e.g.,
Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996) (granting intervention
to unions in discrimination action challenging police department's employment
practices); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983) (granting
intervention to conservation organization to defend government's creation of bird
preservation area); Adams v. Matthews, 536 F.2d 417, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (granting
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possess the relevant interest on its own behalf or by virtue of its
members' interests. 96
As to those classes, direct engagement with the defendant institution and its policies distinguishes them from the general public,
from individuals with merely an ideological interest in the issue of
affirmative action, and from classes-such as students at other institutions-who may be affected indirectly by the development of
affirmative action jurisprudence, but who have no direct relationship to the policies or parties at issue in the instant litigation.97
Yet, despite the manifest practical consequences of affirmative
action litigation for these beneficiaries, courts have denied them
intervention in many of the education cases initiated this decade,98
based on a variety of rationales. In Hopwood, the district court and
court of appeals denied intervention on the ground that the applicants-an organization of Black University of Texas law students
and an association of Black undergraduates whose members intended to apply to the Law School-failed to demonstrate that the
State of Texas would not adequately represent their interests. 99 In
Smith v. University of Washington Law School,1 ° the district court denied intervention on grounds of adequate representation and
timeliness, 01 1 and in the Boston Latin School case, Wessman v. Boston
School Committee,102 the court denied intervention to minority applicants with the explanation that they "[sought] to introduce evidence
which raises issues unrelated to any of the claims made by the parties in the underlying action."'1 3 The applicants, that court explained,
"[could], with greater efficiency, enforce the rights they seek to assert by commencing separate litigation."' 14
Although later reversed by the court of appeals, the district
court in each of the University of Michigan cases initially denied
intervention to similar classes of intermediaries. In the underintervention to women's rights organization to preserve enforcement of gender
discrimination laws).
96. See, e.g., Wooden v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV-497-45
(S.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 1997) (granting intervention to NAACP and others in affirmative
action suit). See generallyVreeland, supra note 59.
97. Cf. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 669 (1993) (holding that where organization's members are ready
and able to bid on public contracts, the organization has standing to challenge racial
impediments to successful bid).
98. See supra notes 11-15.
99. See Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603, 606 (5th Cir. 1994).
100. No. C97-335z (W.D. Wash. July 27, 1998).
101. See Smith v. University of Wash. Law Sch., No. C97-335z, slip op. at 2-3
(W.D. Wash. July 27, 1998).
102. No. 97-11923-JLJ (D.Mass. Jan. 8, 1998).
103. Id. at 1.
104. Id.
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graduate case, Gratz v. Bollinger,'05 the district court held that the
putative intervenors-African American and Latino students who
intended to apply to the University and an organization dedicated
to equal educational opportunity for such students in Michigan' °6lacked a substantial legal interest in the litigation 01 7 and failed to
demonstrate that the state defendants would not adequately represent their interests. 8 The district court in the law school case, Grutter
v. Bollinger,'0 denied intervention to a broader group of applicants"0
on adequacy-of-representation grounds."'
Common to those decisions is a fundamental misapprehension
of the established legal interests of beneficiaries that are at stake in
affirmative action cases and the structural conflicts that prevent an
institutional party-and particularly a governmental defendantfrom adequately representing those interests. Construed in light of
the history and precedent discussed above, Rule 24(a)(2) clearly
vests beneficiaries with a right to intervene in almost all cases challenging race-sensitive policies.

105.
106.

183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
See id.

107. See id. at 213-14 (holding that applicants also could not demonstrate impairment of such an interest).
108.
See id. at 213-14 (citing Hopwood v. State of Texas, 21 F.3d 603 (5th Cir.
1994)). The district court subsequently reaffirmed its decision in ruling on the applicants' motion for reconsideration. See Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 97-CV-75231-DT (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 26, 1998) (order denying reconsideration of motion to intervene).
109. No. 97-CV-75928-DT (E.D. Mich. July 6, 1998).

110. The putative intervenors in Grutter were three organizations and 41 individuals who described themselves as:
Black, Latino/a, Mexican-American, Filipino/a, Asian American and
other students who currently attend the University of Michigan...

including some who attend the University of Michigan Law School;
applicant organizations are interracial coalitions which actively seek
to preserve affirmative action programs at the University of Michigan.
Id. at 1.

ill.

See id. at 3-6. The court assumed, but did not decide, that the movants pos-

sessed a protectable interest.

112. The discussion that follows assumes that a beneficiary's motion is timely
under the rule. Although the question of timeliness is necessarily intertwined with
the legal and factual complexities of each case, see Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306,
1321 (5th Cir. 1980), this Article will not directly address that issue. For a more
thorough consideration of the timeliness question in the affirmative action context,
see Jones, supra note 15.
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B. "Protectable" Interests at Stake
Courts typically have acknowledged that minority students and
other beneficiaries are directly impacted, as a practical matter, by
affirmative action litigation. 113 The district court in Gratz, however,
concluded that the applicants in that case lacked the type of
"significantly protectable" interest required for intervention
right to have
legally
enforceable
"because [they did] not have any
•
•
,,114
That conclusion was
the existing admissions policy continued.
erroneous in at least two respects. Rule 24 requires that an
"interest"-not an enforceable right-be at stake, and the requisite
interest need not attach to the precise outcome sought by one of the
existing parties.
The court of appeals in the University of Michigan cases correctly ruled that a putative intervenor need not demonstrate an
independently enforceable "right" at stake in the litigation in order
to prevail."" Rule 24 has never required such a showing, and, in a
number of cases-including Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of
America116--it is clear that the putative intervenor did not have an
independently enforceable right at stake." 7 Moreover, because
amended Rule 24(a)(2) does not require alignment with an existing
party's objectives,"8 it clearly does not contemplate that an applicant

113. See, e.g., Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1990); In re
Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1496 n.13 (11th Cir. 1987);
Smith v. University of Wash. Law Sch., No. C97-3352, slip op. at 3 (July 24, 1998);
Wooden v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV-497-45, slip op. at 6
(S.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 1997).
114. Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209, 214 (E.D. Mich. 1998), rev'd, Nos. 982009/2248 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1999). The Wessman court may have been expressing the
same concern when it stated that the applicants "seek to introduce evidence which
raises issues unrelated to any of the claims made by the parties in the underlying
action." Wessman, slip op. at 1.
115. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 1999 FED App. 0295P, at 7 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1999)
(rejecting "the notion that Rule 24(a)(2) requires a specific legal or equitable interest")
(quoting Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997)). The
court also rejected the Gratz district court's suggestion that applicants must rely on
an extant consent decree in order to demonstrate the requisite interest. Id.
116. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
117. See 29 U.S.C. § 483 (designating Secretary of Labor as sole entity authorized
to bring suit under provision of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act at
issue in Trbovich); see also Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (acknowledging interest of organization that
sponsored legislation controlling radioactive waste in suit challenging constitutionality of that legislation); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1977)
(granting intervention in title VII suit brought by E.E.O.C. to employees who could
not sue their employer independently).
118. See supra note 80; see also Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818
(5th Cir. 1967) (granting intervention to a party whose claim was hostile to both the
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must have an interest in-much less a right to-the particular outcome
sought by an existing party. Rather, the rule requires "an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action." 9 Just as an applicant with an interest in property need not
support either of the existing parties' claims to that property in order to obtain intervention, applicants under amended Rule 24(a)(2)
may seek120to defend independent interests that are at stake in the
litigation.
In the affirmative action context, beneficiaries possess a range of
established interests of the kind that have traditionally warranted
intervention. Those include both an interest in the admissions policies that are the subject of the suit and an interest in independent
civil rights protections and remedies that are threatened by the litigation.
1. Interests Derived from the Challenged Policy
Beneficiaries have interests under the challenged policy itself that
they may protect through intervention. Courts have repeatedly
government and the rival private claimant in suit by government to enjoin development of an offshore island).
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (emphasis added); see also Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d
694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (expressly rejecting the notion that the rule requires "a
specific legal or equitable interest."); United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate
Appraisers of the Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, 442 F. Supp. 1072, 1080 (D. Ill. 1977) ("[The
interest requirement is satisfied] by something less than a specific legal or equitable
interest in the chose."). See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967) (recognizing intervenor's economic interest in a competitive
market); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (recognizing parents' interest in education of their children).
120. See Advisory Comm. Notes, supra note 41, at 109 ("If an absentee would be
"substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, he
should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene, and his right to do so should not
depend on whether there is a fund to be distributed or otherwise disposed of.")
(emphasis added). To the extent that the Wessman court denied intervention based on
the conclusion that the applicants sought to preserve independent interests in integration and desegregation, rather than the particular admissions policy at issue, the court
ignored Rule 24(a)(2)'s more expansive view of the interests that warrant intervention.
See Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 1982) (granting union
intervention in Title VII suit by Black firefighters where relief sought would conflict
with contractual seniority system); Adams v. Matthews, 536 F.2d 417, 418 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (acknowledging adequate interest of women's rights organization seeking to
preserve federal enforcement of gender discrimination laws in suit by minority parents
seeking federal enforcement of laws requiring racial desegregation of schools); Gaines
v. Dixie Carriers, 434 F.2d 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that a law firm should have
been allowed to intervene in its former client's action to protect firm's interest under a
contingent fee agreement following client's substitution of counsel); see also WRIGHT,
MILLER & KANE, supra note 54, § 1909, at 319 ("The easiest case [for intervention] is that
in which the absentee has an interest that may, as a practical matter, be harmed by
disposition of the action and his interest is not represented at all.").
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held that, in cases challenging the constitutionality or legal validity
of regulatory regimes, non-parties governed by those regimes have
a cognizable interest in the litigation for purposes of intervention.' In other words, the movant's legitimate expectations under
the challenged regime are the relevant "interest relating to the
transaction" for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2). Minority applicants who
are evaluated under the challenged policies, and those already
selected by the defendant institution, clearly occupy that position.
There is no question that a change in admission policies will directly and practically affect them, just as it will the plaintiffs.
2. Independent Interests
A battery of constitutional and statutory provisions also vest
in beneficiaries interests "relating to" the subject of the litigation.
Those provisions-principally the Reconstruction Amendments
and federal civil rights laws-afford beneficiaries both a
"negative" interest in opposing present racial bias and segregation,
and a "positive" interest in proactive desegregation and the elimination of the vestiges of past discrimination. The negative interest
protects against mechanisms and practices that discriminatorily
exclude beneficiaries, 122 while the positive interest often requires
race-sensitive remedial policies. In each instance, there exists a
"significantly protectable"' legal interest that is implicated by
affirmative action litigation.
Beneficiaries' legal interests-both positive and negativederive primarily from the Equal Protection Clause of the

121. See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1496 n.13
(11th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging interest of existing employees in ensuring that antidiscrimination remedy does not improperly displace them); Howard v. McLucas, 782
F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir.
1977) (disallowing employees to sue independently where Equal Employment Opportunity Commission challenges an employer's hiring policies under Title VII, but
granting employees intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)); New York Pub. Interest
Res. Group v. Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 516 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1975) (deeming
that pharmaceutical association had protectable interest in suit against regents of state
university challenging validity of regulation from which association's members benefited); E.E.O.C. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 506 F.2d 735 (3rd Cir. 1974) (acknowledging
interest of union in provisions of collective bargaining agreement with employer which
might be modified or invalidated by a consent decree entered into by the existing
parties); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 54, § 1908 at 285 ("[I]n cases challenging various statutory schemes as unconstitutional or as improperly interpreted and
applied, the courts have recognized that the interests of those who are governed by
those schemes are sufficient to support intervention.").
122. Of course, that interest is also an enforceable right, though it need not be so
for purposes of intervention.
123. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971).
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Fourteenth Amendment' and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The
Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional discrimination and
segregation by state and local entities,'26 while requiring institutions
that have formerly discriminated to eliminate "root and branch" the
vestiges of that past discrimination. 27 The latter command often
requires race-conscious remedial policies, including student
selection."
That an institution's selection procedures are facially neutral
as to race does not mean, a priori, that they were adopted for a
race-neutral purpose and are therefore constitutional. "The Constitution requires.., that [courts] look beyond the face of the statute
...and also consider challenged selection practices to afford
'protection against action of the State through its administrative
officers in effecting the prohibited discrimination."' 129 Nor does the
duty to correct such violations dissipate merely through the passage of time; rather, extant violations continue to require corrective

124. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964), et seq. (prohibiting racial discrimination in
federally funded programs).
126. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (holding that Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional housing discrimination by municipal government); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(rejecting separate-but-equal doctrine; outlawing racial segregation in public
schools). The same principle applies to the federal government through the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (invalidating racial segregation in public schools of
District of Columbia as violative of due process guarantee of Fifth Amendment).
127. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
128. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971)
(stating that district courts are empowered to take "affirmative action in the form of
remedial altering of attendance zones.., to achieve truly nondiscriminatory [pupil]
assignments."); United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225
(1969) (upholding desegregation order that required racial composition of each
school's teaching staff to equal the racial composition of all teachers in the entire
system); see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II) (upholding
educational enhancements focused on African American students to remedy school
segregation); North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971)
(unanimously invalidating state law prohibiting assignment of students on the basis
of race; emphasizing that race "must be considered" not only in determining whether
a constitutional violation exists, but also in formulating its remedy).
129. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986) (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 587, 589 (1935)). Nor must a policy completely exclude members of a particular
racial group in order to offend the Equal Protection Clause. A long line of cases
"establish[] the principle that substantial underrepresentation of [a racial] group
constitutes a constitutional violation as well, if it results from purposeful discrimination." Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977) (citing cases).
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governmental action until remedied.' 3' Indeed, the Supreme Court
recently reiterated that continuing affirmative duty in the context
of higher education, explaining that "if the State has not disduty, it remains in violation of the Fourteenth
charged this 131
Amendment.'
Where a formerly discriminatory institution has not yet been
declared racially unitary, policies that disproportionately exclude
or disadvantage racial minorities are inherently suspect, and may
As the Court recently explained in United States v.
be unlawful.
132
Fordice,

[11f the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its prior system that continue to have
segregative effects-whether by influencing student
enrollment decisions or by fostering segregation in
other facets of the university system-and such policies are without sound educational justification and
can be practicably eliminated, the State has not satisfied its burden of proving that it has dismantled its
prior system. Such policies run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, even though the State has abolished the
legal requirement that whites and blacks be educated
separately and has established racially neutral policies
not animated by a discriminatory purpose.133

130. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating a provision
of the Alabama Constitution, adopted in 1901, that was intended to disenfranchise
African Americans).
131. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 728 (1992); see also Knight v. Alabama, No.
92-6160, slip op. at 5 (11th Cir. Feb. 24, 1994) (recognizing interest identified in Fordice);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (opinion of Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he State has the power to eradicate racial discrimination and its effects in both the public and private sectors, and the
absolute duty to do so where those wrongs were caused intentionally by the State").
132. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
133. Id. at 731-32. The same principle applies in public school desegregation
cases. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973).
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That admonition has obvious relevance for public institutions,
such as those in Texas" and Georgia,' which openly maintained
racially segregated educational systems.' The courts have made
clear, however, that intentional segregation and discrimination
through covert or ostensibly race-neutral policies also violate the
Constitution and invoke the same affirmative desegregation duties. Thus, many northern institutions are similarly affected. The
Boston Public Schools are, of course, a prototypical example.'3
Michigan, too, has been found to have engaged in intentional racial
segregation.139 Accordingly, courts ordered race-conscious relief in
each of those jurisdictions." ° Thus, although the Equal Protection
134. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (invalidating segregated admissions
at University of Texas Law School). Texas public schools in almost every major urban area
remained segregated long after the 1954 Brown decision. See, e.g., United States v. Texas
Educ. Agency (AISD), 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972) (Austin); Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Ross, 282 F.2d 95, 96 (5th Cir. 1960) (Houston); Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.
1957) (Dallas); Flax v. Potts, 204 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Tex. 1962) (Ft. Worth); United States v.
Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970) (nine school districts in Eastern Texas), affd with
modifications, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971), (state-wide relief). While some of those systems
were declared unitary in the late 1980's, see, e.g., Flax v. Potts, 725 F. Supp. 322 (N.D. Tex.
1989) (Ft. Worth), many Texas school districts still have not been declared unitary, see, e.g.,
Tasby v. Edwards, 807 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (Dallas), and many of the districts that
have received such declarations did so on the ground that no practicable remedy existed,
rather than for having eliminated all vestiges of the previous invidious discrimination. See,
e.g., Ross v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 224, 228 (5th Cir. 1983); Flax v. Potts,
725 F. Supp. at 330.
135. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Georgia State Conference of
Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bd. of
Educ., 576 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1978); Acree v. County Bd. of Educ., 458 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.
1972); Wooden v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV 497-45 (S.D. Ga.
Sept. 10, 1997).
136. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, (1992); Knight v. Alabama, No. 926160, slip op. at 5 (11th Cir. Fed. 24, 1994); see also Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp.
92, 101 (D.D.C. 1973), modified and aff'd unanimously en banc, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (requiring enforcement of civil rights laws against segregated systems of
higher education in 17 southern and border states, including Texas and Georgia).
137. See, e.g., Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 396 U.S.
1215 (1969).
138. See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974) (finding that Boston
examination schools were intentionally segregated).
139. In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 724 (1974) (Milliken ), the district court
found that "[g]overnmental actions and inaction at all levels, federal, state and local,
have combined, with those of private organizations, such as loaning institutions and
real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish and to maintain the pattern
of residential segregation throughout the Detroit metropolitan area." 418 U.S. at 724
(quoting district court opinion, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (E.D. Mich. 1971)). Those and other
actions, in turn, led to de jure educational segregation. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 725.
140. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 267, 274 (upholding educational enhancements
focused on African American students to remedy the effects of school segregation);
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 243 (D. Mass. 1975), afl'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.
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it conveys a
Clause prohibits only intentional discrimination,
positive interest in affirmative remedies, as well as a negative interest in non-discriminatory treatment.' 42 In formerly-segregated
institutions, the latter interest includes freedom from policies that
disproportionately exclude students of color.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," which covers public
and private entities that receive federal funds,TM similarly prohibits
intentional discrimination 45 and often requires affirmative remedies 46 In addition, however, the statute and its implementing
regulations 147 together prohibit certain policies and practices with
discriminatory effects, irrespective of whether they are intentionally
discriminatory and irrespective of any past findings of segregation
or discrimination. With respect to covered educational institutions,
1976) (imposing 35% "set aside" for minority students in Boston examination
schools).
141. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
142. Thus, in Hopwood and Wessman, applicants sought to intervene in order to
demonstrate that the defendants were obligated to maintain policies that did not
disproportionately exclude students of color, including, if necessary, race-sensitive
policies. See Brief of Proposed Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants at 2-8, Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996 (No. 50569)); Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion to Intervene at 17, Wessman v. Boston Sch. Comm., No. 97-11923-JLT
(D. Mass. Dec. 18, 1997).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964), et seq.
144. The statute's substantive provision declares that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
145. See, e.g., Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Hankins v. Temple Univ., 829 F.2d 437, 440 (3d Cir. 1987).
146. See Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 151 (1979) (requiring "integration"
by formerly segregated entities under Title VI); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 292,
305 (1976) (upholding, as remedy for government-sponsored segregation of public
housing, "a comprehensive metropolitan area plan [to dismantle] segregated public
housing system in the City of Chicago") (citation omitted); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563 (1974) (requiring school districts with substantial limited-English-proficient
populations to offer English instruction).
147. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2) (1998) (Dep't of Education); 45 C.F.R.
§ 80.3(b) (1) (viii) (2) (1998) (Public Welfare); 15 C.F.R. § 8.4(b) (2) (1998) (Commerce
and Foreign Trade); 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b) (2) (i) (1998) (Housing and Urban Development).
148. In GuardiansAss'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm., 463 U.S. 582 (1983), a majority of the
Court held that, while the Title VI statute reaches only intentional discrimination, the
federal agencies charged with enforcing the statute had issued valid regulations
prohibiting certain discriminatory effects. See 463 U.S. at 607-608 (opinion of Powell,
J.,
in which Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., joined) (statute reaches only discriminatory intent); id. at 635 (opinion of Stevens, J., in which Brennan and Blackmun, J.J.,
joined) (same); id. at 584 (White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court)
(regulations validly prohibit discriminatory effects); id. at 623 n.15 (opinion of Marshall, J.)(statute and regulations prohibit disparate impact as well as intent). A

SPRING 1999]

Foxes Guardingthe Chicken Coop

the Title VI regulatory regime prohibits admissions, placement, and
other meaningful selection criteria that disproportionately exclude
or segregate applicants of a particular race, unless the use of those
criteria is justified by "educational necessity."1 49 That standard requires, among other things, strict validation of selection
methodologies to ensure a strong correlation with the institution's
valid educational goals. 15° The defendant's use of an affirmative
action program does not remove that obligation with respect to its
underlying selection process."'
Because they concern the opportunities available to minority
applicants, and the role of race in access to those opportunities, Title
VI and the Equal Protection Clause clearly vest minority students
15 2
with rights and interests "relating to the ...subject of the action"'
in affirmative action cases. Collectively, those provisions prohibit
unanimous Court reaffirmed that holding in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293294 (1985) ("Title VI ...delegated to the agencies in the first instance the complex
determination of what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities constituted sufficiently significant social problems, and were readily enough remediable, to warrant
altering the practices of the federal grantees that had produced those impacts."); see
also Alan Jenkins, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Racial Discriminationin Federally Funded Programs, in 10 CMIL RIGHTS LrIGATION AND ATrORNEY FEE HANDBOOK
182, 192 (S. Salzman & B. Wolvovitz eds., 1995), and cases cited therein.
149. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Harris,444 U.S. 130, 151 (1979) (requiring a showing
of "educational necessity" to justify a policy which causes a racially disproportionate
impact); see also Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1413 (11th
Cir. 1993) (requiring "educational necessity"; a "manifest relationship" to the defendant's mission); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775
F.2d 1403, 1418 (11th Cir. 1985) (proclaiming that educational necessity demands a
"manifest demonstrable relationship to classroom education.").
150. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2) (U.S. Dept. of Education Title VI regulations
requiring, inter alia validation of selection criteria); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th
Cir. 1984) (holding that the use of non-validated IQ tests with a discriminatory effect
on Black children to place students in classes for the educable mentally retarded
violates Title VI); Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518 (M.D. Ala.
1991) (enjoining under Title VI state board of education from using minimum ACT
score as requirement for admission to undergraduate teacher training program); see
also Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't. 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (ruling
that use of SAT scores to award merit scholarships where 10-point male/female
score differential existed established primafacie violation of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681-1688).
151. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (rejecting under Title VII the
proposition that an affirmative action policy that produces a non-discriminatory
"bottom line" precludes liability as to otherwise discriminatory selection criteria).
152. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
153. Note that the federal civil rights laws not only protect minorities who are
excluded; but also grant insiders of all races a right to an integrated environment free
of racial bias. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), in which a
unanimous Supreme Court held that Black and White residents of Richmond, Virginia, and an organization dedicated to promoting low-and moderate-income
housing had standing under the Fair Housing Act to challenge segregative conduct
by a real estate agent. The individuals were held to have a litigable interest in"the
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policies and actions intended to disadvantage, exclude, or segregate
beneficiaries based on race; proscribe most policies by formerlysegregated public bodies that have a discriminatory result; outlaw
selection criteria with racially disparate effects at federally-funded
institutions; and require affirmative remedies-at times including
race-sensitive policies-to remediate extant violations. Those
positive and negative interests plainly are at issue in suits seeking to
alter a university's admissions process. Moreover, as the following
section explains, those interests are not merely implicated, but
placed at direct risk by the litigation, so as to warrant intervention of
right.
C. Impairment of Beneficiaries' Interest
The disposition of affirmative action suits inevitably threatens
to "impair or impede" beneficiaries' ability to protect their interests.1 Those suits, by definition, seek to limit a defendant's ability to
address perceived discrimination and racial isolation through racesensitive policies. Yet, it is well established that a blanket rule
against the consideration of race not only frustrates civil rights enforcement, but can also violate the Constitution. In Board of Education
v. Swann,"' for example, the Supreme Court struck down North
Carolina's Anti-Busing Law, which flatly forbade the assignment of
any student on account of race for the purpose of creating a racial
balance or ratio in the schools and prohibited busing for such purposes.156 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger
explained:

important social, business and economic, political and aesthetic benefits of interracial
associations that arise from living in integrated communities free from discriminatory housing practices" and the impairment or frustration of the organization's
activities. Id. at 363.
154. FED.R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Because the district court in Gratz held that the applicants lacked a protectable interest, it necessarily concluded that no such interest
would be impaired by the litigation. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209, 212 (E.D.
Mich. 1998), rev'd, 1999 FED App. 0295P (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1999).
155. 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
156. The statute, N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 115-176.1 (Supp. 1969), provided in pertinent
part:
No student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school on
account of race, creed, color or national origin, or for the purpose of
creating a balance or ratio of race, religion or national origins. Involuntary bussing [sic] of students in contravention of this article is
prohibited, and public funds shall not be used for any such bussing

[sic].
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[T]he statute exploits an apparently neutral form to
control school assignment plans by directing that they
be 'color blind'; that requirement, against the
background of segregation, would render illusory the
promise of Brown v. Board of Education. Just as the race of
students must be considered in determining whether a
constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race
be considered in formulating a remedy. To forbid, at
this stage, all assignments made on the basis of race
would deprive school authorities of the one tool
absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional
1 7
obligations to eliminate existing dual school systems. 1
The inflexible, "color-blind" policies that affirmative action
plaintiffs seek to impose similarly threaten to deprive school officials
of an important tool for measuring, identifying, and remedying civil
rights violations, contrary to the interests of beneficiaries. In other
words, as in Swann, a blanket mandate to "ignore" race can hamper
an institution in its duty to avoid racially disparate effects and to
remediate discriminatory policies.
Moreover, bipolar affirmative action litigation can establish adverse legal precedent and factual findings that are at the heart of
beneficiaries' interests under the civil rights laws. If a court holds,
for example, that an institutional defendant is free of present and
prior discrimination or the remediable effects of past segregation,
adverse stare decisis"' will make it exceedingly difficult for beneficiaries in a subsequent suit to advance a cause of action based on those
allegations. That potentiality is well illustrated by Hopwood, in which
the courts found, inter alia, that "in recent history, there is no evidence of overt, officially sanctioned discrimination at the University
of Texas."1 9
157. 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (internal citation omitted); see also Washington v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S.457 (1982) (invalidating on Equal Protection grounds state
initiative banning busing of students for purposes of school desegregation).
158. Courts have repeatedly held that the potential for adverse stare decisis is the
type of threatened impairment contemplated by Rule 24(a)(2). See, e.g., Oneida
Indian Nation v. New York, 732 F.2d 261 (2nd Cir. 1984); Francis v. Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, 481 F.2d 192, 195 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1973); Atlantis Dev.
Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 826-28 (5th Cir. 1967); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d
694 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Note, however, that the relevant stare decisis effect is as to the
particular subject matter or property at issue in the instant case; the adverse effect of
precedent on subsequent, unrelated litigation does not justify intervention. See
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 54, § 1908, at 305.
159. 78 F.3d 932, 954 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551,
572 (W.D. Tex. 1994)). The risk of such findings clearly is relevant under Rule
24(a)(2). See, e.g., Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (allowing Black
employees of Library of Congress to intervene in Title VII class action against library
where applicant would rely on similar evidence as plaintiffs and there was substan-
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Even more daunting is the possibility that beneficiaries will
have to challenge elements of a court-ordered remedy in collateral
proceedings.'60That prospect is thrown into stark relief by the Hopwood court's ruling that the UT Law School:
[M]ay not use race as a factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse student
body, to combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment at the law school, to alleviate the law school's
poor representation in the minority community, or to
eliminate any present effects of past discrimination by
actors other than the law school. 61
Because challenges to affirmative action policies typically rely
on test scores and other numerical measures-both in asserting the
plaintiff's entitlement to admission and in advancing a remedial
regime based on the plaintiff's conception of "merit'162 -they
threaten beneficiaries' interest against selection criteria with a discriminatory purpose or effect. Where affirmative action has ended,
institutions have typically reverted to heavy reliance on numerical
measures that have a racially discriminatory impactlu and often lack
the predictive validity that the civil rights laws require. Indeed, a
growing body of evidence speaks to the lack of meaningful predic-

tial
potential for practical impairment of the intervenor's interests); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 1982) (granting intervention to union in
Title VII suit by Black firefighters where relief sought would conflict with contractual
seniority system); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1977)
(allowing aggrieved employee to intervene in E.E.O.C.-initiated Title VII suit against
employer).
160. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 418 (1954) (conflicting
judgements to be avoided); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367
(1934) (same). It is clear, however, that such attacks are permissible. See Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765 (1989) ("The linchpin of the 'impermissible collateral attack'
doctrine-the attribution of preclusive effect to a failure to intervene-is ... quite
inconsistent with Rule 19 and 24.").
161. Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1996).
162. See Susan Strum & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL.L. REv. 953, 968-980 (1996) (discussing reliance on standardized measures); see also Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 8-11, Smith v. University of Wash. Law Sch.,
No. C-97-335, (filed Jan. 20, 1998) (relying on numerical measures); Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97-CV-75928-DT, 9120, 23 (E.D. Mich. filed Dec. 3, 1997) (same);
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 937 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting, by reference to median
test scores, that racially "disparate standards greatly affected a candidate's chance of
admission.").
163. See Orfield, supra note 32, at 7-9 (describing adverse effects of those criteria
where affirmative action has terminated); Strum & Guinier, supra note 162, at 968998 (same); see also supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
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tive value of standardized tests commonly used in the admissions
context.16
Once instituted, inappropriate or inflexible standardized measures can have an immediate and lasting impact on the interests of
beneficiaries. The court of appeals recognized that reality in the
University of Michigan cases:
There is little room for doubt that access to the University for African American and Latino/a students will be
impaired to some extent and that a substantial decline
in the enrollment of these students may well result if
the University is precluded from considering race as a
factor in admissions. Recent experiences in California
and Texas suggest such an outcome. The probability of
similar effects in Michigan is more than sufficient to
meet the minimal requirements of the impairment element.16
Even if later corrected through subsequent litigation or policy
reform, racial isolation and resegregation within public universities
and other institutions will inevitably affect the hearts and minds of a
large cohort-perhaps a generation-of beneficiaries "in a way unlikely ever to be undone."1 " That impairment of beneficiaries' legal
and practical interests clearly implicates Rule 24(a)(2)'s protective
function.

164. See DAVID OWEN, NONE OF THE ABOVE: BEHIND THE MYTH OF SCHOLASTIC
APTITUDE 207 (1985) (discussing the weak correlation between SAT scores and college grades); WARREN W. WILLINGHAM ET AL., PREDICTING COLLEGE GRADES: AN
ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL TRENDS OVER Two DECADES (1990) (same); see also
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998)
(documenting the success of African American students who attended-as a result of
affirmative action-universities with median SAT scores above their own); CHARLES
ROONEY, TEST SCORES DO NOT EQUAL MERIT: ENHANCING EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE
IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS BY DEEMPHASIZING SAT AND ACT RESULTS (1998)
(discussing misuse and misconceptions regarding standardized tests); Lani Guinier
et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 23 n.70, 27 n.74 (1994) (noting the weak relationship between LSAT and
first, second, and third-year grades for men and women, students of color, and White
students); A Measurement of What?, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, Sept. 4,
1997, at 18 (discussing misuse and misconceptions regarding standardized tests).
165.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 1999 FED App. 0295P, at 9-10 (6th Cir. Aug. 10,

1999).
166.

Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954).
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III. INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION BY DEFENDANTS
The civil rights protections discussed above vest in beneficiaries
substantive rights and interests againstthe defendants in affirmative
action cases. Indeed, it has been excluded individuals and civil
rights groups who have primarily enforced those laws against public
and private institutions, "act[ing] not only on their own behalf but
also as private attorneys general in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority."'6 7 Given the history of
conflict between minority communities and governmental institutions over equal opportunity and integration, it is ironic that the
most common ground on which courts have denied intervention in
affirmative action cases has been that beneficiaries' interests would
be adequately represented by the existing governmental defendants."
Those rulings have rested on two interrelated lines of reasoning,
both of which are analytically flawed. The first is a doctrinal rule
that has developed in several circuits under which courts presume
that government litigants adequately represent all interested nonparties for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2). 69 The second is a systematic
undervaluing by those courts of conflicts between the interests of
beneficiaries and those of defendants. For the reasons that follow, a
presumption of adequate representation by government is misguided and, irrespective of whether such a presumption applies, the
conflicts inherent in affirmative action cases make intervention by
beneficiaries appropriate in almost all cases.
A. The Presumptionof Adequate Government Representation
There is disagreement among the circuits as to whether, and
to what degree, the adequacy-of-representation inquiry should be
different where one of the existing parties is a governmental entity.
The Fifth Circuit employs a strong presumption that governmental
parties adequately represent the interests of non-parties seeking
167. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Northcross v. Memphis Bd.of Educ., 412 U.S. 427,
428 (1973) (noting private attorney general function of civil rights litigation); Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969) (same); Newman v. Piggie Park Enter.,
390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (same).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 99-111.
169. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603, 606 (5th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Washington, No. C97-335Z, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 1998); Grutter v. Bollinger,
No. 97-CV-75928-DT, at 4 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 1998) (opinion and order denying
motion to intervene) (available at University of Michigan Law School) (visited September 5, 1999) <http://umich.edu/-newsinfo/Admission/gruord.html>, rev'd,
1999 FED App. 0295P (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1999).
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intervention. 17 As the Hopwood court explained, that standard
requires "a much stronger showing of inadequacy" in
government cases.
The Second Circuit similarly requires a
"strong showing" of inadequate representation when the purported
representative is a state or municipal entity or the federal
government.17 The First, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits
employ a similar presumption. 7 In the circuits that have adopted it,
the presumption of adequate government representation necessarily
applies to intervention in all suits challenging public affirmative
action programs.
The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, has expressly repudiated the presumption of adequate government representation, holding instead
that "where the government [is] the purported representative, ....
'the requirement of inadequacy of representation is satisfied if the
applicant shows that representation of its interests "may be" inadequate and ... the burden of making that showing is minimal.' ""74
The Ninth Circuit therefore applies the same test of adequacy to
suits involving private and governmental parties.
The district courts in each of the University of Michigan cases
appear to have invoked the presumption to deny intervention to
beneficiaries.' The court of appeals reversed, however, noting that
"this circuit has declined to endorse a higher standard for inadequacy when a governmental entity is involved.' 76 Consequently,
170. See Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1005 (1996) (en banc) ("[W]hen
the putative representative is a governmental body or officer charged by law with
representing the interests of the absentee, a presumption of adequate representation
arises whether the would-be intervenor is a citizen or subdivision of the governmental entity.").
171. Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603, 605 (5th Cir. 1994).
172. See United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 987 (2d Cir.
1984); see also id. at 984 ("[W]e agree with the Third, Fifth and District of Columbia
Circuits that, in litigation of this sort, a greater showing that representation is inadequate should be required.").
173. See Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104 F.3d 185, 187-88 (8th Cir. 1997); Brody v.
Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1124 (3rd Cir. 1992); American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v.
City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1989); Dimond v. District of Columbia,
792 F.2d 179, 192-193 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d
141,144 (1st Cir. 1982).
174. United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also Legal Aid
Soc'y v. Dunlop, 618 F.2d 48, 50 (9th Cir. 1980).
175. See Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97-CV-75928-DT, at 4 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 1998)
(opinion and order denying motion to intervene) (available at University of Michigan Law School) (visited September 5, 1999) <http://unich.edu/-newsinfo/
Admission/gruord.html>; Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209, 212 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(same).
176. Grutter v. Bollinger, 1999 FED App. 0295P, at 10 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1999)
(citing Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also
Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding minority em-
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whatever ambiguity existed heretofore, the Sixth Circuit has now
squarely rejected the presumption.
Although the Tenth Circuit has not explicitly considered a presumption of adequate government representation, it has construed
the inadequacy requirement liberally in cases involving governmental parties, acknowledging "the familiar situation in which the
governmental agency is seeking to protect not only the interest of
the public but also the private interest of the petitioners in intervention, a task which is on its face impossible.""m Similarly, the Fourth
Circuit has not directly addressed the presumption, but has noted
the inherent conflict of interest between government's representation of the public interest generally and the more focused interests of
specific applicants for intervention. 178 The Eleventh Circuit also employs a uniform adequacy inquiry and has recognized the potential
clash between the diverse interests served by governmental litigants
and the narrow interest of putative intervenors. 179
Close analysis of the reasoning underlying the presumption of
adequate government representation demonstrates that it should be
rejected."s Nothing in the text or history of Rule 24(a)(2) supports a
special, heightened showing for suits involving government. Rather,
the development of the Rule recounted above, and the general principle that courts should interpret the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure liberally,' strongly militate against such a barrier to intervention. More particularly, the presumption contravenes clear
ployees entitled to intervene in a challenge to a municipal affirmative action policy,
noting that city-defendant's interest in defending its hiring practices was distinct
from those of minority job applicants).
177. Coalition of Ariz./N.M. Counties v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 100 F.3d 837,
845 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing National Farm Lines, 564 F.2d 381, 384 (10th Cir. 1977)).
178. See In re Sierra Club, 945 F.2d 776, 780 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[a] South
Carolina [agency] in theory, should represent all of the citizens of the state ...Sierra
Club on the other hand, appears to represent only a subset of citizens concerned with
hazardous waste-those who would prefer that few or no new hazardous waste
facilities receive permits.").
179. See, e.g., Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 985 F.2d 1471, 1478 (11th Cir.
1993).
180. The persistent circuit conflict on this issue warrants Supreme Court intervention. United States Supreme Court Rule 10(a) provides that certiorariis warranted
where, inter alia, "a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important
matter." SuP. CT. R. 10(a).
181. See Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 983
F.2d 211, 216 (11th Cir. 1993) ("Any doubt concerning the propriety of allowing
intervention should be resolved in favor of the proposed intervenors because it
allows the court to resolve all related disputes in a single action.") (citing Sierra Club
v. Robertson, 960 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir. 1992)); Washington State Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting "liberal" standard for intervention); see also Miller v. Amusement Enters., 426 F.2d 534, 537 (5th
Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted) (same).
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Supreme Court precedent and is contrary to the role of government
as litigant.
1. The Trbovich and CascadeDecisions
A presumption of adequate government representation plainly
ignores the Supreme Court's decisions in Trbovich v. United Mine
1
Workers 18 2 and Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. '
As discussed above, each of those cases involved government plaintiffs charged with representing interests that included those of the
putative intervenors."' Yet, in each case, the Court granted intervention in terms applicable to governmental and private suits alike.'
And in Trbovich, the Court made clear that an applicant's burden in
such circumstances is "minimal." 186 That relaxed standard is simply
incompatible with the "strong showing" that courts have required in
applying the presumption.
Further, the Trbovich Court found that representation might be
inadequate in that case based on the structural distinction between
the broad public interests served by government and the narrow
interests pursued by affected non-parties.187 Itdefies reason to conclude that that rationale would countenance a heightened adequacy
standard for suits involving government. Rather, governmental
defendants' broad and diverse interests cut the other way: it is more
likely that a public defendant will have an interest against vigorously
advancing certain relevant evidence and arguments. Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the presumption at least in part in reliance on
Trbovich.1
Conversely, the circuits that do apply the presumption have
made little or no attempt to explain its facial inconsistency with
Trbovich and Cascade. The Hopwood court's discussion of the issue is
typical:

182. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
183. 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
184. See infra text accompanying notes 60-76.
185. See id.
186. 404 U.S. at 538 n.10.
187. See id. at 538-39.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1986)
(describing Trbovich as requiring showing that "representation of interests 'may be'
inadequate and ... the burden of making that showing is minimal," for purposes of
inadequacy of representation) -(quoting Sagebrush Rebellion v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525,
528 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also Chayes, supra note 58, at 1293 ("The Ninth Circuit's
approach to the inadequate representation requirement is probably a fairer reading
of Trbovich.").
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The Supreme Court held in 1972 that the burden is
"minimal" and that the requirement "is satisfied if the
applicant shows that representation of his interest 'may
be' inadequate ....But where the party whose representation is said to be inadequate is a governmental
agency, a much stronger showing of inadequacy is required. 89
That statement ignores the fact that Trbovich itself involved a
governmental party pursuing the same objective as the movants
under statutory authority to do so.y'° In sum, the Supreme Court's
prior rulings on the adequacy-of-representation issue make a presumption of adequacy untenable.
2. The ParensPatriaeRationale
The doctrinal underpinnings of the presumption are also
flawed. Courts that apply the presumption typically rely on the
9 -literally, "parent of the country"192--a
doctrine of "parens patriae""'
principle of Article III standing under which government entities
may initiate suits on behalf of their citizens.9 3 That doctrine,
however, does not justify a presumption of adequate representation
for intervention purposes, especially when the public entity is a
defendant in the litigation. Parens patriae jurisprudence has
consistently distinguished between the "quasi-sovereign" interests of
the state, on the one hand, and the narrower interests of particular
individuals or classes of individuals, on the other. A state may
invoke the doctrine when the former type of interest-such as "the
health and well-being ... of its residents in general"94-is at stake,
but not merely to pursue the rights or interests of particular
individuals.9
That distinction mirrors the Trbovich Court's

189. Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603, 605 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added)
(quoting Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 n.10).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 60-77.
191. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chem. and Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 984
(2d Cir. 1984); Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 1000
(8th Cir. 1993).
192.
193.

BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 3-20, at 147-151

(2nd ed. 1988).
194. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (emphasis
added).
195. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976); North Dakota v.
Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923);
Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 220 U.S. 277 (1911); Kansas v.
United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907).
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reasoning and undermines a blanket presumption of adequate
government representation.
Illustrative of that distinction is Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico, 196 in which the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sued a
number of farming concerns in Virginia, alleging that those companies had discriminated against Puerto Rican workers in violation of
federal labor and immigration laws. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in its parens patriae capacity, Puerto Rico asserted that the
alleged discrimination deprived the Commonwealth of its right "to
effectively participate in the benefits of the Federal Employment
Service System of which it is a part," and thereby injured its efforts
"to promote opportunities for profitable employment for Puerto
Rican laborers
and to reduce unemployment in the Common, 197
wealth.
The Supreme Court held that Puerto Rico had parens patriae
standing to maintain the suit. The Court first noted that parens patriae
standing does not arise when the State is merely "stepping in to represent the interests of particular citizens who, for whatever reason,
cannot represent themselves .... " "Rather, "the State must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private
parties." 9 Specifically, it must articulate a "quasi-sovereign interest," which includes, among other things, an interest "in the health
and well-being-both physical and economic-of its residents in
general."'" ° Applying those principles, the Court held that Puerto
Rico had a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting a substantial segment of its citizenry from discrimination and in securing its rightful
status within the federal system."'
By contrast, in Pennsylvania ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center,2 2 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and a nurse sued
a state-funded psychiatric center that had earlier terminated the
nurse's employment. The suit alleged that, by firing the nurse for
criticizing the hospital in a newspaper interview, the hospital had
violated her First Amendment rights. 203 The court dismissed the
Commonwealth for lack of standing and ruled that in order to assert
parens patriae standing, a governmental entity must demonstrate:
196. 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
197. Id. at 600.
198. Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976); Oklahoma ex rel.
Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938); Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 220 U.S. 277 (1911)).
199. Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
200. Id. at 607.
201. See id. at 608-610.
202. 356 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
203. See id. at 502.
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(1) that a substantial number of the state's inhabitants are threatened
with injury; and (2) that the state's injury is somehow separate and
distinct from the injury to individuals. 2° The case at bar met neither
the alleged injury directly affected
of those requirements because
205
only the private plaintiff.
A long line of decisions reinforces the distinction between the
private interests of individuals and the more general public concerns
that support parens patriae status. 206 Indeed, a number of cases suggest that the government may proceed in that capacity only where
27
private plaintiffs could not obtain full relief in an independent suit. 0
Importantly, the case law does not suggest that remedying discrimination and promoting diversity do not qualify as important
governmental responsibilities that serve the public welfare, or that a
government entity cannot properly invoke parens patriae status to
vindicate civil rights or other constitutional interests. 2°8 Rather, the
204. See id. at 505.
205. In the court's view, the Commonwealth's asserted interest in the free flow of
information regarding state-operated programs was too remote and speculative to
support parens patriaestatus. See id.
206. Compare Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (stating that Pennsylvania lacked parens patriae standing to challenge New Jersey's "transportation
benefits tax" as violative of Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses;
the litigation was, in reality, a collectivity of private suits against New Jersey for
withheld taxes), with Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (stating that
Pennsylvania and Ohio properly invoked parens patriae status in suit to enjoin West
Virginia from enforcing state legislation that would constrict the supply of natural
gas into their territories; each state sued first, as proprietor of public institutions
whose supply of gas would be cut off by the threatened interference with interstate
commerce, and second, as representative of the consuming public, whose health,
comfort, and welfare were jeopardized by the threatened withdrawal of gas from the
interstate stream). See generally Satsky v. Paramount Communications, 7 F.3d 1464,
1469 (10th Cir. 1993) (allowing state to sue to protect citizens against pollution of air
over its territory, but not to assert the rights of private individuals); Pennsylvania ex
rel. Sheppard v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 22 (3rd Cir. 1975)
(stating that a quasi-sovereign interest must be an interest of the state existing separate and apart from those injuries suffered individually by the state's citizens); TRIBE,
supra note 193, § 3-20, at 147 (explaining that "[when] a state is merely suing on
behalf of its citizens without possessing any independent injury to itself, the standing
requirement is ordinarily thought not to have been satisfied.") (footnote omitted).
207. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 316 (3rd Cir. 1981) (allowing
state to maintain suit against police officer and officials for unconstitutional abuse of
citizens where, inter alia, individual victims lacked the resources to challenge a
broad-based pattern of police abuse and, in any event, might be unable to show a
likelihood of future violations); State ex rel. McCain v. Metschan, 32 53 P. 1071 (Or.
1898) (stating that parenspatriae authority is implicated where the wrong complained
of is public in character, affecting no one citizen more than another, leaving private
plaintiffs without remedy).
208. The case law is strongly to the contrary. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp and Sons v.
Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) (allowing Commonwealth to sue a private company,
alleging that it had discriminated against its citizens in employment, especially in
light of the history of invidious discrimination against Puerto Ricans); Porter, 659
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import of parens patriaejurisprudence for present purposes is that the
government's participation in a suit through that mechanism is no
substitute for the role of an otherwise qualified intervenor seeking to
protect its own narrower interests. To the contrary, Rule 24(a)(2)'s
requirement that applicants possess a distinct and identifiable interest in the subject matter of the existing suit ensures that intervenors'
concerns will be independent of the more diffuse public interest that
the government pursues in its parens patriaecapacity.
Accordingly, a general presumption of adequate government
representation is far too blunt an instrument to draw support from
the particularized role and function of the parens patriae doctrine. As
applied by most courts, the presumption does not distinguish between cases in which the government is a defendant, as opposed to a
plaintiff, or between cases in which the government pursues its own
pecuniary or proprietary interests and those in which it seeks to
protect the health and welfare of its citizens. Thus, where an applicant satisfies Rule 24(a)(2)'s "interest" requirement, its motion
should not be defeated on a parens patriaerationale.
More broadly, the representational role and responsibilities of
government in a democratic society make a blanket presumption
of adequate representation inappropriate. Governments represent
all of their residents, and must necessarily balance constituents'
competing interests. That role contrasts starkly with the position of
individuals and organizations affected by the subject matter of the
litigation. 20' For example, a public entity's representative role may
cause government litigants to adopt compromise approaches or to
change positions over time. The Supreme Court has acknowledged
that reality where the federal government acts as litigant, commenting that "[iun addition to those institutional concerns
traditionally considered by the Solicitor General, the panoply of
important public issues raised in governmental litigation may quite
properly lead successive administrations of the Executive Branch to
take differing positions with respect to the resolution of a particular
issue. 21°
F.2d at 316 (allowing state to sue police officials as parens patriae to remedy unconstitutional police misconduct); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa.
1966) (state had standing as parens patriae in suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enjoin a
school from refusing to admit African American students).
209. See, e.g., In re Sierra Club, 945 F.2d 776, 780 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[A state agency],
in theory, should represent all of the citizens of the state," whereas a public interest
group represents only a subset of citizens concerned with a particular issue).
210. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161 (1984) (rejecting collateral estoppel of United States). Public entities are also susceptible to agency capture and
ideological bias. Yet those phenomena are difficult to demonstrate in a particular
case and courts are understandably loath to so label the actions of a sitting administration. A presumption of adequate representation by government ignores those
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The distinction between public and private interests is clearly
evident in affirmative action cases. While the residents of a state or
municipality-and, therefore, their government-have an interest in
remedying discrimination within the jurisdiction, that general concem is necessarily distinct from the particularized interests of
minority applicants (who will be considered under different standards if the suit is successful) and members of the current student
body (whose academic environment may be radically altered as a
result of the litigation).
Moreover, the very posture of those cases-in which the government appears as a defendant to maintain its policiesundermines the presumption. Whatever the validity of the parens
patriae rationale in cases in which the government initiates litigation
under statutory authority on behalf of the putative intervenor, no
such mandate exists where the government is haled into court as a
defendant. Although the interests of the private applicant and the
government may overlap in that situation, they clearly diverge as
well, so as to make a presumption of adequacy inappropriate.2
B. Undervaluationof Conflicting Interests
The courts that have denied intervention based on adequate
representation have also dismissed or undervalued the conflicts that
exist between the interests of beneficiaries and interests of state defendants. They have ruled, for example, that the movants failed to show
that the State would not vigorously defend its program, or that the
movants lacked a "separate defense" of the program that the defendants had failed to assert.212 But that standard is inappropriately high
realities or, at least, improperly adds to the burden already facing applicants in those
circumstances.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 101 F.R.D. 451, 457
n.5 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984) ("It is not uncommon for courts
to depart from the parens patriae doctrine when the action is one in which government regulations are challenged and private parties who benefit from such
regulations seek to intervene as defendants."); see also Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104
F.3d 185, 188 (8th Cir. 1997) ("If the citizen stands to gain or lose from the litigation
in a different way from the public at large, the parens patriaewould not be expected
to represent him."); Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207-1208 (5th Cir. 1994)
("[The] government must represent the broad public interest, not just the economic
concerns of the timber industry.") (emphasis in original); Dimond v. District of
Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that government representation
of private parties is inadequate in certain circumstances due to government duty to
represent broad public interest).
212. See Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d at 605; Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97-CV75928 at 4 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 1998) (available at University of Michigan Law
School) (visited September 5, 1999) <http://umich.edu/-newsinfo/Admission/
gruord. html>) ("Defendants indicate that they will vigorously defend this case, and
the proposed intervenors have not offered any persuasive reason why the Court
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and asks the wrong question; Rule 24(a)(2) requires movants to
demonstrate only that representation "may be" inadequate.213 That
requirement is satisfied, at a minimum, where the supposed representative's interests diverge from, or conflict with, those of the
movant.7" While mere disagreement with an existing party's tactics
may not alone demonstrate inadequate representation, 15 the fact that
an applicant seeks to address relevant issues that the existing party
may not-due to conflicts, collusion, or nonfeasance-does."'6 Even
should doubt this representation."), rev'd, 1999 FED App. 0295P (6th Cir. Aug. 10,
1999); id. at 12-13 (no separate defense); Smith v. Washington, No C97-3357, slip op. at
3 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2998) (Law School "has vigorously defended its policy thus
far.., and there is no basis for concluding that it will not continue to do so.").
213. Even where the presumption of adequate government representation applies, courts repeatedly have held that the presumption of adequate representation is
rebutted where the existing party has an interest that is potentially adverse to those of
the proposed intervenor. Significantly, that standard does not require that those
interests be diametrically opposed. See, e.g., Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 985
F.2d 1471, 1478 (11th Cir. 1993) (ruling that voters are entitled to intervene in voting
rights suit to defend at large system, county commissioner defendants "had to consider the overall fairness of the election system .... the expense of litigation ...and
the social and political divisiveness of the election issue"); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865
F.2d 1197, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that alien detainees have distinct interest in conditions of confinement that may not be served by county government
concerned with effect of detention facility on outside community); Kneeland v.
NCAA, 806 F.2d 1285, 1288 (5th Cir. 1987) (recognizing adversity of interests
"between agency attempts to represent the regulated parties and statutory mandates
to serve the 'public interest' ") (citations omitted); New York Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Regents of N.Y., 516 F.2d 350, 352 (2d Cir. 1975) (putative intervenors, an
association of pharmacists, had a narrower, economic interest in regulatory statute
than did the defendant regents); Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F.2d 726, 738 (5th Cir. 1976)
(granting intervention to state examiner in municipal employment discrimination
suit where "[h]is interests... may not coincide completely with those of defendants
below."). Courts have similarly held that the presumption of adequate representation
by parties seeking the same ultimate objective as the applicant must fall under those
circumstances. See Bush v. Vitema, 740 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1984).
214. See Standin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 1962) (Blackmun J.)
(holding that representation is inadequate where representative possesses an adverse
interest, fails to fulfill its duty, or colludes with an opposing party); Jansen v. City of
Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[Ilnterests need not be wholly 'adverse'
before there is a basis for concluding that existing representation of a 'different'
interest may be inadequate.") (quoting Nuesse v. Camp., 385 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir.
1967)); see also Martin v. Kalvar Corp., 411 F.2d 552, 553 (5th Cir. 1969) (enumerating
the same considerations under current Rule 24(a)(2)); WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra
note 54, § 1908, at 292 (same). Nor must an intervenor advance a "separate defense."
See AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding movant's different
"approach and reasoning" sufficient).
215. See, e.g., Bumgarner v. Ute Indian Tribe, 417 F.2d 1305, 1308 (10th Cir. 1969)
(holding that the fact that appellants would have handled the case differently "is not
sufficient to challenge the adequacy of the representation"); Pierson v. United States,
71 F.R.D. 75, 80 (D. Del. 1976) ("A simple difference as to litigation tactics is insufficient to satisfy the inadequate representation requirement.").
216. See, e.g., Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating
that where city and African American putative intervenors disagreed as to factual
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assuming the validity of a presumption of adequate representation,
the presumption is rebutted by such a showing.217
Dynamics unique to the defense of affirmative action policies
create inherent conflicts between the interests of party defendants
and beneficiaries. Adversity of interest arises from the substantive
legal showing necessary to defend race-sensitive programs, in terms
of defendants' liability concerns, administrative and fiscal considerations, and political pressures surrounding the sensitive issue of race.
1. Liability Concerns
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co, 218 and Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena,219 the Supreme Court held that certain public affirmative
action programs intended to remedy racial discrimination are subject to strict constitutional scrutiny2 0 Under Croson and Adarand,
such programs are lawful when they are narrowly tailored to address the continuing effects of past or present discrimination..'
In
predicate for affirmative action plan, intervention must be granted); Sagebrush
Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted) (inquiring
"whether [the defendant] will undoubtedly make all of the intervenor's arguments,
whether [the defendant] is capable of and willing to make such arguments, and
whether the intervenor offers a necessary element to the proceedings that would be
neglected.").
217. See Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207-1208 (5th Cir. 1994) (presumption
is rebutted where interests of movant and government may diverge in fact; in the
instant case, "government must represent the broad public interest, not just the
economic concerns of the [industry movants]"); Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104 F.3d
185, 187-188 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[A] proposed intervenor may rebut this presumption,
among other ways, by showing that the parens patriaehas committed misfeasance or
nonfeasance in protecting the public."); id. at 188 ("If the citizen stands to gain or lose
from the litigation in a different way from the public at large, the parens patriae
would not be expected to represent him."); accord Meek v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 985 F.2d 1471, 1478 (11th Cir. 1993); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197,
1214-15 (11th Cir. 1989); Kneeland v. NCAA, 806 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (5th Cir. 1987);
New York Pub. Interest Res. Group v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 516 F.2d 350, 352 (2d
Cir. 1975).
218. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
219. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
220. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 236 (federal set-aside program); Croson, 488 U.S. at
494 (municipal set-aside program).
221. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-92. Though precedentsetting in terms of the level of scrutiny that they imposed, those rulings also reaffirmed a line of cases standing for the proposition that "government bodies... may
constitutionally employ racial classifications essential to remedy unlawful treatment
of racial or ethnic groups subject to discrimination." United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (citing Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v.
E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 480 (1986), and cases cited therein); see also Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) ("The Court is in agreement that ... remedying
past or present racial discrimination ...is a sufficiently weighty state interest to
warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program.")
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order to defend those efforts, institutions must demonstrate a
"strong basis in evidence for [their] conclusion that remedial action
was necessary."'
Although an institution need not confess that it is presently liable
for unlawful racial discrimination in order to defend an affirmative
action plan,m evidence of past and present discrimination by the
defendant institution and continuing effects of that discrimination
are central to the survival of such plans. In particular, the Croson
standard places great weight on evidence that would raise an inference of liability against the government under the Equal Protection
Clause and 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Croson Court focused, for
example, on the role of racial disparities in identifying past and
present discrimination, 224 noting the relevant statistical comparisons
for demonstrating remediable discrimination:
In the employment context, we have recognized that for
certain entry level positions or positions requiring
minimal training, statistical comparisons of the racial
composition of an employer's work force to the racial
composition of the relevant population may be
probative of a pattern of discrimination.... But where
special qualifications are necessary, the relevant
statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Public institutions
may address identified private racism, as well as their own discrimination, through
appropriate race-conscious measures. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-92 ("It would seem
... clear ...that a state or local subdivision (if delegated the authority from the
State) has the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its
own legislative jurisdiction."). By contrast, more diffuse "societal" discrimination
cannot support such efforts. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 499.
222. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (plurality opinion));
see also Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52, 57 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying "strong basis"
requirement).
223. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("This remedial purpose
need not be accompanied by contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to
be accepted as legitimate as long as the public actor has a firm basis for believing
that remedial action is required."); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 492 (stating that narrowly tailored affirmative action is permissible where government has become a
"passive participant" in racial exclusion by private actors).
224. See 488 U.S. at 501 ("There is no doubt that '[wihere gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone in a proper case may constitute prima facie proof of a
pattern or practice of discrimination' under Title VII.") (quoting Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-308 (1977)). The Court has long held that
racial disparities are probative of intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-96 (1977); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Michael 0.
Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination
Cases, 80 HARv. L. REv. 338 (1966). But see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
(holding that evidence of statistical disparities in capital sentencing was insufficient
to demonstrate Equal Protection violation).
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discriminatory exclusion must be the number of
minorities qualified to undertake the particular task.25
The latter standard is appropriate in the higher education
context, where students must meet certain minimum requirements.
Yet that same showing creates a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination against the affirmative action defendant vis-A-vis
excluded minorities-that is, the putative intervenors. 6 Under the
Equal Protection Clause, when a person affected by a governmental
policy "has shown substantial underrepresentation of his group, he
has made out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the
burden then shifts to the State to rebut that case." 7 As the Supreme
Court recently explained, that rule is based on the principle that "the
impact of an official action is often probative of why the action was
taken in the first place since people usually intend the natural
consequences of their actions."t' If the government cannot provide
an adequate race-neutral explanation for the disparity, then it is
liable to members of the underrepresented group under the
Constitution.29 Thus, by proffering evidence of the racial disparities
that would exist absent the use of race-sensitive policies, affirmative
action defendants expose themselves to potential liability to

225. Croson, 488 U.S. at 501-502. (citing Hazelwood, 443 U.S. at 308; Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 651-652 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment)).
226. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (O'Connor, J.) (stating that the program at issue
could not withstand strict scrutiny because "[tihere is nothing approaching a prima
facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation by anyone in the Richmond construction industry") (emphasis in original).
227. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 (1977); see also Batson v..Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986) ("Once the defendant makes the requisite showing [by establishing a prima facie case], the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the
racial exclusion. The State cannot meet this burden on mere general assertions that
its officials did not discriminate or that they properly performed their official duties," but must demonstrate that the challenged effect was due to "'permissible
racially neutral selection criteria.' ") (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625,
631-32 (1972)).
The same dilemma arises in challenges to voluntary affirmative action in employment under Tile VII. In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 20809 (1979), the Supreme Court held that private employers may take race into account
in their employment decisions in order to eliminate "a manifest racial imbalance" in
"traditionally segregated job categories" and when the decisions do not
"unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees." In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627 n.6, 631 (1987), the Court held that Title VII permits
public employers to take race into account in like circumstances. The "manifest
imbalance" requirement, though less stringent than the Croson standard, similarly
implicates liability concerns for affirmative action defendants.
228. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., No. 95-1455 (May 12, 1997).
229. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 493-500; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241
(1976).
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minority applicants. 3 For formerly segregated institutions, such
evidence may demonstrate that further remedial efforts-and court
supervision-are needed.21 Thus, an affirmative action defendant
cannot advance a vigorous defense of its program on remedial
grounds without risking liability to beneficiaries and others under
the Constitution. The same dilemma exists for defendants who are
recipients of federal funds and for employers under the disparate
treatment standards of Titles VI'2 and V11' of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, respectively.2
Under those provisions' disparate impact principles, the risk of
liability for defendants is even greater. Statistical disparities of the
kind described in Croson give rise to a prima facie case of disparate
impact discrimination that a defendant may rebut only through
evidence that its selection criteria are empirically valid and maniThe
festly necessary to its legitimate institutional objectives.

230. See Charles Lawrence, When the Defendants are Foxes Too: The Need for Intervention by Minorities in "Reverse Discrimination" Suits Like Bakke, 34 GUILD PRAC. 1, 8
(1978) (asserting that, in the Bakke litigation, "[sluch a defense would have constituted an admission that would have subjected the defendant to legal attack by
minority students who had been denied admission."). That is true both where minority applicants contend that the Constitution requires race-conscious policies and
where the contention is simply that the institution's underlying selection system is
discriminatory.
231. See generally United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992) (stating that segregative effects of admissions criteria and disparate attendance rates were evidence
that state had not disestablished its racially dual system of higher education); Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973) (requiring formerly segregated school
board to prove that its conduct "did not create or contribute to" the racial identifiability of its schools or that racially identifiable schools are in no way the result of
school board action).
232. See Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375, 1384 (M.D. Fla. 1981)
(applying Equal Protection inquiry in Title VI case).
233. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (statistical disparity establishes
prima facie case); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)
(same); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (same).
234. Title VII's employment protections do not cover student admissions, but
may be relevant to the employment of graduate students as teaching assistants.
Moreover, the principles discussed here are equally applicable to cases involving
affirmative action in public employment. Also relevant to the defense of affirmative
action programs are the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits
racial discrimination in private contracts, and a host of state and municipal civil
rights laws. Cf.New York State Club Assn. v. New York City, 487 U.S. 1, 10-11, 1314 (1988) (upholding municipal ordinance prohibiting private racial discrimination).
See supra note 149 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1)
235.
(A) (i) (1998) (stating that in order to stand under Title VIL an employment practice
with a racially disparate effect must be "job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity").
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institution bears both the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion in making that showing.236
The threat of disparate impact liability by affirmative action defendants to minority applicants is not merely speculative. Minority
students recently filed a suit against the University of California at
Berkeley, alleging that its post-affirmative action admissions policy
discriminates against African American, Latino, and Filipino American applicants in violation of Title VI. 237 Specifically, the plaintiffs
allege that University of California, Berkeley's over-reliance on
standardized test scores and advanced placement coursesunavailable in many predominantly-minority schools-has a racially
adverse impact on the plaintiff groups that is not justified by educational necessity.23'
Challenges to numerical selection procedures have been
particularly successful under Title VI,239 and, as has been mentioned,
a growing body of research and commentary contends that
standardized measures such as the SAT, LSAT, and MCAT have
discriminatory effects and lack the predictive value that the civil
rights laws demand. 24°
236. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) ("[T]he term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of production and persuasion.") (emphasis added); Elston v. Talladega County
Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 & n.14 (11th Cir. 1993) (applying same standard in
Title VI case).
237. Rios v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 99-0525, Complaint (filed Feb. 2,
1999); see also M. Fletcher, Civil Rights Groups File Suit Over Calif. Admissions Policy,
WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at A2. A similar class of plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged the validity of Proposition 209 itself under federal constitutional and
statutory law. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997). Ironically, the Center for Individual Rights--counsel
for plaintiffs in Hopwood, Gratz, Grutter, and Smith, supra-obtained intervention in
that case on behalf of the sponsors of the initiative.
238. See Rios v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 99-0525, Complaint at 15-18
(filed Feb. 2, 1999).
239. See Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984) (use of non-validated IQ
tests with discriminatory effect on Black children to place students in classes for the
educable mentally retarded violates Title VI); Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
776 F. Supp. 1518 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (enjoining under Title VI state board of education
from using minimum ACT score as requirement for admission to undergraduate
teacher training program); see also 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2) (1998) (U.S. Dept. of Education regulations implementing Title VI); Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709
F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (use of SAT scores to award merit scholarships where
10-point male/female score differential existed violated Title VI's sister statute, Title
IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681-1688).
240. The same is true of a range of non-numerical criteria employed by admissions offices. Consider, for example, so called "legacy" admissions, in which
universities apply relaxed standards to the relatives of alumni. See John Larew, Why
Are Droves of Unqualified, UnpreparedKids Getting into Our Top Colleges? Because Their
Dads Are Alumni, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, June, 1991, at 10 (noting, inter alia, that
one-fifth of Harvard students received admissions preferences because their parents
attended the University; and that Yale "legacy" applicants were two-and-a-half times
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The Croson standard thus requires defendants to risk liability to
minority applicants in order to defend their affirmative action policies on remedial grounds. That awkward posture brings the
defendant's interest in avoiding liability into conflict, first, with
beneficiaries' narrower and unencumbered interest in preserving
remedial policies and second, with the beneficiaries' independent
interest in opposing factual findings and injunctive remedies that
vitiate their rights to unbiased selection procedures and a desegregated environment. 241 In each instance, the specter of civil rights
liability prevents defendants from adequately representing the
interests of beneficiaries. Accordingly, the court of appeals in Grutter was correct in holding that conflicts inherent in a remedial

more likely to be accepted to that school than were their "unconnected" peers). For
formerly-segregated or racially homogeneous institutions, that practice has the effect
of perpetuating past exclusion with no discernable educational benefits. Similarly,
preferences for students from well-funded schools with advanced placement and
other competitive courses also tend to disadvantage students of color.
241. In Hopwood, the movants sought to advance both of those interests. They
moved for intervention in order to present evidence that the Texas Index-a formula
which uses as factors a student's LSAT score and undergraduate GPA-was invalid
as applied to African American students because it failed to predict reliably their
academic success at the Law School. See Hopwood v. Texas, No. 94-50569, Brief of
Proposed Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants at 15-18 (filed Dec. 19, 1994). In a
declaration, the movant's expert concluded:
(1) that regression analysis results obtained by the Law School Admission Services... conclusively demonstrate that the selection
criteria which the Law School has used to evaluate African American
applications was invalid, (2) that the Texas Index should not have
been used as an initial sorting criterion for African American applications, but (3) that the practice of reducing the numerical values of
the Texas Index required of African American applications had, at
least some ameliorative effect upon the invalid application of the
Texas Index.
Id. at 16.
If proven, that allegation would have rendered the TI-upon which the plaintiffs based their theory of liability and desired remedy-invalid under Title VI. See,
e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2) (1998) (U.S. Dept. of Education Title VI regulations prohibiting use of invalid selection criteria with discriminatory effects); Larry P. v. Riles,
793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984) (use of non-validated IQ tests with discriminatory effect
on Black children to place students in classes for the educable mentally retarded
violates Title VI). The applicants in Hopwood further argued that de-emphasizing the
TI for African American applicants was a necessary and lawful response to the
limitations of that measure for that group of students. Brief of Proposed IntervenorsDefendants-Appellants at 30 (filed Dec. 19, 1994). See Kirkland v. New York Dept. of
Corrective Services, 628 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980) (approving the addition of 250 points
to the raw scores of groups adversely impacted by invalid examination); Association
Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 594 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.
1979) (indicating lowering the cutoff score for minority test takers might be a suitable
remedy for an invalid test with a discriminatory effect).
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defense raised the possibility that representation by the State might
be inadequate:
We find persuasive [the movants'] argument that the
University is unlikely to present evidence of past discrimination by the University itself or of the disparate
impact of some current admissions criteria, and that
these may be important and relevant factors in determining the legality of a race-conscious admissions
policy.2'
Significantly, the Court in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke2' held that the educational benefits of a diverse student body
also provide a compelling governmental interest which supports a
"properly devised admissions program.,, 244 As the Court has since
noted, "a 'diverse student body' contributing to a robust exchange of
ideas is a constitutionally permissible goal on which a race-conscious
university admissions program may be predicated. 2 ~ Following
that precedent, numerous lower courts have upheld public
affirmative action policies on diversity grounds. 246 Because the Bakke
diversity standard allows "an admissions program where race or
ethnic background is simply one element-to be weighed fairly

242. Grutter v. Bollinger, 1999 FED App. 0295P, at 11 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1999). The
accuracy of that finding was subsequently confirmed by a University official's public
statement that "[wie strongly disagree that our admissions process is discriminatory
in any way." Peter Schmidt, The Chronicle of Higher Education, Today's News: Court
Opens Way for Minority Students to Intervene in Mich. Affirmative-Action Case (visited
September 3, 1999) <http://www.chronicle.com/daily/99/08/99081101n.htm>.
243. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
244. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
245. Metropolitan Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 568 (1990), overruled in part,
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A]Ithough its precise
contours are uncertain, a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been
found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher education, to support
the use of racial considerations in furthering that interest.").
246. See Jacobson v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 961 F.2d 100, 102-03 (6th Cir. 1992)
(finding compelling interest in obtaining educational benefits of racially diverse
faculty); Zaslawsky v. Board of Educ., 610 F.2d 661, 663-64 (9th Cir. 1979) (same);
Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that law enforcement
agency had compelling interest in diverse workforce); Talbert v. City of Richmond,
648 F.2d 925, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1981) (same); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young,
608 F.2d 671, 695-96 (6th Cir. 1979) (same); University and Community College Sys.
of Nevada v. Farmer, 930 P.2d 730 (Nev. 1997) (upholding the consideration of race
by the University of Nevada at Reno in hiring in order to diversify its faculty). But see
Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (rejecting diversity rationale in
Title VII context), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117, (1997), dismissed as moot, 522 U.S. 1010
(1997).
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against other elements-in the selection process,, 247 it may raise
fewer of the liability concerns discussed above. However,
demonstrating the need for specific efforts to achieve diversity likely
requires the same type of statistical disparity evidence as does a
remedial defense. Moreover, because plaintiffs in affirmative action
cases have typically sought decisions overruling or ignoring Bakke,2'
and at least one lower court has essentially done so, 249 a diversity
defense offers no protection to beneficiaries' anti-discrimination
interests.
It also bears noting that those interests are not merely a subset
of the defendant's interests. Beneficiaries will often be well served,
for example, by a ruling that sets aside an existing selection process,
but recognizes the necessity of non-discriminatory selection criteria,
the need to remedy past discrimination, and the availability of lawful means to meet those demands.' So long as the remedy serves
those goals, it is likely to protect beneficiaries' interests in the litigation. For the defendant, however, such a ruling would contravene its
interest in avoiding liability and court-imposed limitationsion its
autonomy.
That conflict was manifest in Hopwood, where beneficiaries
sought intervention in part to attack the Law School's
undergraduate admissions criteria, which relied heavily on
numerical measures that the movants' expert found to be invalid for
African American students.2' Not surprisingly, none of the existing
parties advanced that argument. Similarly, beneficiary-movants in
the Wessman case sought intervention to demonstrate that "selecting
among qualified students in the manner proposed by plaintiffs,
based solely on composite [numerical scores] would vitiate [their]
interest in a constitutional and non-discriminatory ... admissions
process. ' ' 2 The threat of liability inherent in the Croson standard and

247. 438 U.S. at 318; see also id. at 316 (discussing favorably the Harvard University admissions program).
248. See Center for Individual Rights, Michigan Questions and Answers
<http://www.wdncom/cir/mighiqu.htm> (visited July 19, 1998) (contending that
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke "does not correctly state the law").
249. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1033 (1996).
250. See Lawrence, supra note 230, at 8 ("Intervenors [in Bakke] would have offered
evidence to demonstrate that the effect of the University's substantial reliance on [the
MCAT] is to actively discriminate against minorities since the tests make minorities
appear to be less qualified than their subsequent performance in medical school
proves them to be.").
251. See supra note 241.
252. No. 97-11923-WGY, Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene,
at 7 (filed Sept. 11, 1997); see also slip op. at 13 ("[N]o one (least of all, the School
Committee) claims that the examination or any component thereof is discriminatory
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beneficiaries' interest in prohibiting discriminatory selection criteria
make affirmative action defendants inadequate representatives of
minority movants.
2. Administrative Concerns
Another type of conflict that arises in affirmative action cases
relates to the divergent economic and administrative interests of
institutional defendants on the one hand, and the narrower participatory interests of beneficiary groups on the other. As in many
public law cases, the government's interests as administrator-here
of a public educational system-diverge from those of beneficiaries
as participants within that system. As Professor Moore has explained:
In some situations, the government's representation of
the general public interest will put it in sufficiently
sharp conflict to private interests that those private interests may intervene because, in fact, they are not
adequately represented by the government. This is frequently the case when one group of citizens sues the
government, challenging the validity of laws or regulations and the citizens who benefit from those laws or
regulations wish to intervene and assert their own, particular interests rather than the general, public good.'
Intervention by affected non-parties is particularly appropriate
in such public law cases because of their potential to affect outsiders
in unforeseen ways.'
In the affirmative action context, defendants have an interest
not only in avoiding liability, but also in maintaining selection
criteria and other operating procedures that are easy to administer,
relatively inexpensive, and enjoy broad support. Beneficiaries, in
contrast, are generally unconcerned with the particular mechanisms
that are used, so long as they are fair and preserve equal
opportunity.
in operation or effect, or that it would be discriminatory if it were used as the sole
criterion for admission.").
253. MOORE ET AL., supra note 34, 1 24.03[41[a], at 24-49.
254. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 270 n.1 (1989) (arguing that intervention is particularly appropriate in public law cases); Cindy Vreeland, Public Interest Groups, Public Law
Litigation,& FederalRule 24 (a), 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (1990) (same); Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation:A Commentary on the Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 244 (1978) (same); Symposium, Problems of Intervention in Public Law Litigation,
13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 211 (1980) (same).
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Again, those divergent interests are particularly well-illustrated
by the role of standardized tests and other numerical selection criteria. In addition to ease of use-when compared with interviews,
portfolio approaches, and other less quantifiable methodologiesstudent test scores have become an integral part of a university's
perceived standing in the academic community and among potential
applicants. A former admissions officer recently explained this phenomenon:
Part of what admissions officers worry about," says
[former Dartmouth admissions officer Michele]
Hernindez, "is the college guide books that kids read,
which list the average S.A.T. scores for every college. If
colleges take too many kids with lower scores, their averages drop, and that can create a domino effect. Once
colleges start reporting lower average scores, they seem
less desirable, and they stop attracting the strongest
kids. 2'
Beneficiaries' interest in challenging certain standardized tests
and other measures that disproportionately exclude applicants of
color is therefore potentially at odds with defendants' institutional
interest in maintaining those measures.26
3. Political Concerns
In addition to administrative factors, a range of political concerns limit institutional defendants' willingness vigorously to
defend affirmative action policies. For example, the admission of
discrimination--especially recent or contemporaneous discrimination-is a difficult and politically sensitive endeavor for any public
institution.5 7 Additionally, legislators, trustees, alumni, athletic
255. Tony Schwartz, The Test Under Stress, THE NEW YoRK TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan 10,
1999, at 51.
256. See Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 803 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[Alny such claim
[that numerical measures are discriminatory] would make precious little sense in the
context of the School Committee's argument, for standardized achievement tests (a
component of the entrance examination) are the primary objective measurement of
the asserted achievement gap.").
257. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1082 n.47 (D. Md. 1993) (noting
that a university defending an affirmative action program is put in the "unusual
position" of having "to engage in extended self-criticism to justify its pursuit of a
goal that it deems worthy"); Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 985 F.2d 1471, 1478
(11th Cir. 1993) (granting intervention in challenge to at-large voting system, stating
that county commissioners "were likely to be influenced by their own desires to
remain politically popular and effective leaders," as well as "the social and political
divisiveness of the election issue"); see also Lawrence, supra note 230, at 8
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programs, and others often bring strong political pressure to bear on
university admissions staff to serve various constituencies and interests. Such pressures rarely coincide with beneficiaries' interests.
Partisan and ideological opposition to affirmative action by
politicians and others with influence over the defendant institution
can also defeat adequacy of representation. Obvious examples of
that phenomenon include the machinations of the Reagan Justice
Department to eliminate affirmative action policies, including decrees that the Unites States had sought as plaintiff in civil rights
litigation. The Department's strategies during that period included
changing the government's position from support to opposition in
important affirmative action cases25 and, at the extreme end of the
spectrum, authorizing covert court filings by non-civil service attorneys to avoid consultation with responsible Department
personnel. 9
While one hopes that such backroom dealings are the rare exception, similar conflicts arise whenever the institution or counsel
charged with defending a policy includes elements opposed to that
policy. In Hopwood, for example, Texas' then Attorney General Dan
Morales announced that he opposed affirmative action and would
not handle the university's appeal. 26° Similarly, after the Fifth Circuit's liability ruling in Hopwood, the Attorney General of Georgiaa state outside of the Fifth Circuit-recommended that affirmative
action policies in the state's colleges and universities be revised or
eliminated in light of the ruling. 261 Those decisions and public statements by top law enforcement officials clearly pose practical barriers
to adequate government representation, in both existing and future
litigation.262

("[I]nstitutions, just as individuals, find it difficult to recognize and accept their own
prejudice. Recognition of past ethnic discrimination would amountf to an unAmerican confession.").
258. See B. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 102, 147 (1997).

259.

See id. at 168.

260.

See Rex Bossert, Texas AG Abandons 'Hopwood', NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL,

May 11, 1998, at A10. (quoting then Attorney General Dan Morales as stating publicly that his office "hard] identified no sufficient grounds" for an appeal).
261. See William H. Honan, New Attack on Race-Based Admissions, N.Y. TIMES,
April 10, 1996, at B8.
262. Cf. Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 737-738 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that
Governor who originally opposed English-only ballot initiative became inadequate
representative of initiative sponsors after governor declined to appeal decision
holding initiative unconstitutional).
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IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF DENYING
INTERVENTION TO BENEFICIARIES

The foregoing legal, administrative, and political conflicts demonstrate that affirmative action defendants cannot adequately
represent the interests of beneficiaries. Yet one might still query
whether the participation of beneficiaries actually makes a difference. If that question were considered purely in terms of the survival
of challenged policies, the response might be negative thus far. The
Podberesky court allowed beneficiaries to intervene, while the Hopwood and Wessman courts did not. Yet in each of those cases, the
district court upheld the consideration of race in the admissions
process,2" only to be overturned by the court of appeals.2" The University of Georgia case, in which beneficiaries gained participation,
was largely dismissed on standing grounds, with one plaintiff receiving one dollar in nominal damages.2" The University of
Michigan cases, in which intervention was granted, and the Smith
case, in which intervention was denied, had not concluded at the
time of this writing. Moreover, although courts have typically
granted intervention to minority voters in constitutional challenges
to "majority-minority" electoral districts 26-which pose similar constitutional questions and, therefore, corresponding conflicts for

263. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (finding the challenged affirmative action policy unlawful, but holding that the University could
continue to consider race in its admissions process); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F.
Supp. 1075 (D. Md. 1993) (denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment); Wessman v. Boston Sch.
Comm., 996 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1988) (upholding, after a bench trial, the Boston
Latin School's consideration of race in student assignment).
264. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (reversing summary
judgment for defendants and ordering summary judgment for plaintiff); Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 931 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the law school may not consider
race in its admissions process); Wessman v. Gittens, No. 98-1657 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding Boston Latin's policy unconstitutional).
265. See Tracy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. No. CV-497-45 (S.D. Ga. July 6,
1999) (orders dismissing case as to one plaintiff on standing grounds, refusing to
certify case as a class action, and awarding remaining plaintiff $1.00 in nominal
relief).
266. See Lawyer v. United States Dep't of Justice, 117 S.Ct. 2186 (1997) (noting
intervenor-defendants); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (same); Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899 (1996) (same); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (same).
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government defendants 267-the Supreme Court has invalidated a
number of those districts, notwithstanding that participation.2 "
Such an inquiry is unduly narrow, however. Beneficiaries
should typically be granted intervention in affirmative action cases
not because their presence will guarantee the validation of challenged policies in any given case, but because their participation in
the litigation is likely to inform the deliberative process, afford them
a voice in defense of their own interests, and reduce the likelihood of
subsequent litigation on the same subject matter. Thus, the proper
question is whether their participation serves Rule 24(a)(2)'s truth
seeking, protective, and judicial economy functions. 269 A comparison
of the Hopwood and Wessman decisions, on one hand, and the Podberesky and Wooden decisions, on the other, suggests that the
participation of beneficiaries in the latter cases served those functions.
The Hopwood decision not only invalidated the particular policy
at issue, but also swept away a range of values and protections of
critical interest to beneficiaries. The court ruled, inter alia, that Justice
Powell's recognition of diversity as a compelling governmental
interest in Bakke270 was no longer good law;" that intentional
discrimination in Texas' K-12 public schools and the University of
Texas system was beyond the Law School's ability to redress
267. Equal protection challenges to the consideration of race in the redistricting
process designed to remedy past discrimination and comply with the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 pit plaintiffs against state and local governments with a history of racial
exclusion in voting.
268. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (invalidating North Carolina congressional districts); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (invalidating Texas congressional
districts); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (invalidating Georgia congressional
districts). But see Lawyer v. United States Dep't of Justice, 117 S. Ct. 2186 (1997)
(upholding settlement plan for state legislative districts against equal protection
challenge).
269. Perhaps it bears noting that one need not support affirmative action in order
to embrace the intervention analysis advanced here. Nor, for that matter, must a
movant seek to defend the particular affirmative action policy at issue in order to
warrant intervention to protect its independent interests.
270. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-315 (1978). The Court
has subsequently cited Bakke for the proposition that "a 'diverse student body' contributing to a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally permissible goal' on
which a race-conscious university admissions program may be predicated." Metropolitan Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 568 (1990), overruled in part, Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
271. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 ("We agree with the plaintiffs that
any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of achieving
a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment."); id. at 945-946 ("[W]e see the caselaw as sufficiently established that the use
of ethnic diversity simply to achieve racial heterogeneity, even as part of the consideration of a number of factors, is unconstitutional.").
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through race-sensitive policies; 272 that a racially hostile environment
and poor reputation in minority communities were not the type of
effects that the Law School could redress through affirmative
action;273 that the race-sensitive policy was not part of the
University's obligations under Title VI; 74 and that the State's
desegregation duties under United States v. Fordice27 did not expand
the Law School's ability to combat past discrimination through racesensitive admissions.276 More broadly, the decision embraced the
validity of numerical admissions criteria as a measure of student
merit.2
Although the Wessman court assumed, arguendo, that diversity
could provide a compelling governmental interest, 27 it rejected the
notion that "racial isolation" limits minority students' willingness to
participate in class
ion;rejected the notion that a permanent
injunction in prior school desegregation litigation justified affirmative action,2° found insufficient evidence that racially disparate
achievement in the Boston schools was attributable to remediable
28 ' and equated
discrimination;
numerical criteria with "strict merit
22
selection."

By comparison, the Podberesky court-which heard from
beneficiary intervenors-ruled rather narrowly. It held that factual
disputes existed as to the link between the school's racially hostile
environment, poor reputation, underrepresentation of African
American students, and low Black retention rates, on the one hand,
and past discrimination on the other. 283 It further held that the
272. See id. at 950 ("[W]e conclude that the district court erred in expanding the
remedial justification to reach all public education within the State of Texas.").
273. See id. at 952.
274. See id. at 954.
275. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
276. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955.
277. See id. at 938. (describing racially disparate mean GPA and LSAT scores of
admittees as a "lowering of standards"; noting that the Law School's original policy-which it later abandoned--'apparently helped the law school maintain a pool
of potentially acceptable, but marginal, minority candidates."). Also of relevance to
the putative intervenors, both courts in Hopwood found that "in recent history, there
is no evidence of overt, officially sanctioned discrimination at the University of
Texas." Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 572 (W.D. Tex. 1994), quoted in Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 954.
278. See Wessman v. Gittens, No. 98-1657 (Nov. 19, 1998), slip op. at 6.
279. See id. at 9.
280. See id. at 11.
281. See id. at 13.
282. Id. at 10; see also slip op. at 13 ("[N]o one (least of all, the School Committee)
claims that the examination or any component thereof is discriminatory in operation
or effect, or that it would be discriminatory if it were used as the sole criterion for
admission.").
283. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 154-57 (4th Cir. 1994).
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African American scholarship program at issue in that case was not
narrowly tailored because it was limited to high-achieving Black
students, included non-residents of Maryland, and utilized an
"arbitrary" reference pool for determining the degree of Black
underrepresentation." In other words, though it eliminated the
challenged program, the court did not seriously undermine
beneficiaries' broader anti-discrimination and remedial interests in
future cases.
Clearly, the limited breadth of the Podberesky ruling sprang in
part from its posture-on appeal from cross-motions for summary
judgment. Nonetheless, it also appears that the participation of minority beneficiaries helped to preserve the subsidiary civil rights
protections that were at risk, albeit sub silentio, in that litigation. In
the University of Georgia case, the court denied the plaintiff's request for class certification and compensatory damages based on the
intervenors' expert witness testimony that the plaintiff would not
process.
have been admitted even under a "race-blind" admissions
The participation of beneficiaries in that case was therefore dispositive. The resolution of cases currently pending will, no doubt,
provide further insight into the practical ramifications of intervention.
CONCLUSION
Intervention by beneficiaries in affirmative action cases serves
Rule 24(a)(2)'s protective, economy, and truthseeking functions. It
ensures that beneficiaries have an opportunity to defend their own
constitutional and statutory interests that are at stake in those cases;
it reduces the likelihood that affected non-parties will engage the
courts in subsequent litigation on the same subject matter; and it
ensures that relevant factual and legal aspects of the case are not
neglected due to the existing parties' conflicts and limitations.
This is not to say that every beneficiary automatically warrants
intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) in every affirmative action case.
Rather, the interests at stake and the structural and political conflicts
common to most affirmative action litigation recommend a practical,
rebuttable presumption in favor of intervention in such cases.28
284. See id. at 158-60.
285. See Tracy v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys., No. CV-497-45, slip op. at 5-7
(S.D. Ga. July 6, 1999). Notably, that testimony was provided by the same expert
witness whose testimony was excluded in Hopwood. See id. (describing testimony of
Dr. Shapiro).
286. A general prescription, applicable in certain substantive categories of cases,
is consistent with the underpinnings of Rule 24. The propriety of intervention necessarily entails consideration of the substantive law and evidentiary requirements of
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Intervention will not be appropriate where: (1) the purported
beneficiary lacks the incentive or capacity to advance the
independent interests that it identifies; (2) an existing party (or prior
intervenor) has an unfettered motivation to advance the beneficiary's
interests-that is, for case-specific reasons, an existing litigant lacks
the conflicts identified herein and demonstrates an intention and
ability to advance the beneficiary's interests;287 (3) the movant
possesses the same conflicts or limitations as the existing parties,
making its participation of negligible value; or (4) the movant,
though a beneficiary, seeks to advance an irrelevant,' frivolous, or
unlawful objective. In those situations, Rule 24(a)(2)'s truthseeking
function would not be advanced by granting intervention, and the
nexus between the existing litigation and the Rule's protective and
efficiency functions would be too attenuated to warrant
intervention. Absent those types of particularized concerns,
however, courts ought to grant intervention of right to beneficiaries
in the vast majority of affirmative action cases.
More broadly, allowing the participation of beneficiaries in such
cases maintains not just the reality, but the appearance of fairness.
The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that Rule 24 is "a comprehensive inventory of the allowable instances for intervention,"
noting that the public interest may require that intervention be allowed wholly outside of the rule. 9 Accordingly, even if a strict
reading of Rule 24(a)(2) did not require intervention in these circumstances, the participation of beneficiaries would be necessary to
the underlying dispute. See, e.g., Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 530536 (1972) (reviewing the text and legislative history of Labor Management Reporting Act to determine that intervention by union member was appropriate); United
States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984) (reviewing text and
legislative history of Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, and Resource Conservation Recovery Act to conclude that citizen suit provisions in each statute do not
grant private parties the right to intervene).
287. Note, however, that where a movant seeks intervention early in the litigation-rather than, for example, for the purpose of appealing a decision or opposing
settlement-its showing of inadequacy will be somewhat speculative. It may not be
clear, for example, precisely what evidence the existing parties will develop and
present at trial. The applicant's showing must, therefore, focus on divergent interests, potential conflicts, and the likely impact of those conflicts on the litigation of
issues affecting the applicant's interests. Though predictive, that presentation is fully
consistent with the applicant's burden of showing that representation "may be"
inadequate.
288. An "irrelevant" interest in this context is one that is not potentially implicated by the litigation, not merely one that has not been identified by the existing
parties.
289. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 505 (1941); see
also Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (same); Textile Workers
Union v. Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ("Obviously tailored to fit
ordinary civil litigation, these provisions require other than literal application in
atypical cases.").
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preserve the integrity of the judicial process. As the Supreme Court
has noted in other contexts, "justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice."290 That command is particularly salient in matters of race,
29 1
where there has been a legacy of exclusion from the justice system.
At the time that the Hopwood plaintiffs filed their suit, for example, there was a forty-year history of legal and political adversity
between African Americans and the State of Texas as to the precise
subject of the litigation: the elimination and remediation of racial
segregation and its effects. That history included Heman Sweatt,
who first challenged segregation at the University of Texas in 1946,292
as well
of, as
293 generations of Title VI enforcement, spurred by students
of color. Civil rights struggles in Georgia, Boston, and other regions have been similarly contentious.2' The notion that those
students' rights should now be decided in bipolar litigation between
those same state governments and plaintiffs hostile to minority opportunity strains credulity and degrades the appearance of
fairness.295 That, in many of those cases, denial of intervention rested
upon a finding of adequate representation is particularly troubling.
290. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (commenting on a trial judge's
discretion under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); cf.In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
26 (1967) (discussing studies that suggest that "the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness... may be more impressive... so far as [a] juvenile is concerned.").
291. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977) (finding discrimination in selection of grand jurors); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (same); Carter
v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 331-337 (1970) (finding discrimination in selection of grand and petit jurors); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552
(1967) (same). See generally DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE (1999) (detailing the

pervasive effects of race in the criminal justice system); SAMUEL R. GROSS AND
ROBERT MAURO,

DEATH AND

DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL

SENTENCING (1989) (describing relationship between a criminal defendant's race, the
race of the victim, and the likelihood that the death penalty will be sought and imposed by prosecutors, judges, and juries).
292. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
293.
See ALMETRIS DUREN & LOUISE ISCOE, OVERCOMING: A HISTORY OF BLACK
INTEGRATION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN (1979) (recounting struggle by

Black students and civil rights leaders to desegregate the University of Texas system,
and to eliminate persistent discriminatory practices such as Whites-only dormitories
and sports teams in the 1960s and 1970s).
294. See, e.g., supra note 135 and accompanying text (citing Georgia desegregation
litigation); Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92, 101 (D.D.C. 1973), modified and affid
unanimously en banc, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring enforcement of civil
rights laws against segregated systems of higher education in 17 southern and border
states, including Texas and Georgia); supra note 142 (citing Boston school desegregation litigation).
295. As the Supreme Court has stated in the grand jury context, the exclusion "of
[African Americans], or any group otherwise qualified to serve, impairs the confidence of the public in the administration of justice.... 'The injury is not limited to
the defendant-there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the
community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our
courts."' Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979) (quoting Ballard v. United States,
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Ultimately, affording participation to beneficiaries in affirmative action cases comports with the letter and spirit of Rule 24 while
supporting the legitimacy of the judicial process and respecting the
interest and ability of affected communities to defend their own
interests. The vital questions of equal opportunity and racial justice
posed by these cases deserve nothing less.

329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)); see also Lawrence, supra note 230, at 8 ("To allow a case of
the magnitude and impact of Bakke to be decided without an opportunity for minorities to present vital evidence... is a travesty of justice.").

